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INTRODUCTION
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing . . . if the consequences were not
despoiling the economy (and our retirement funds), the avalanche of corporate
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defections would be downright entertaining. Among the largest and most widely
followed publicly held corporations, these kinds of firms were once thought the
least likely to undertake risky actions that would lead to financial fraud.
Nonetheless, large publicly held corporations increasingly have misrepresented
their financial health.' As a result, corporate governance has become a key issue
for reinvigorating investor confidence, impelling legislation, commentary and
debate. This Article draws on insights from evolutionary biology, game theory,
and cognitive decision theory to examine the current global crisis in corporate
governance and proposes solutions to this predicament.
The current crisis in corporate governance is a consequence of a pervasive
undermining of safeguards designed to prevent financial fraud. Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the courts have whittled away
investor protections under the federal securities regulations using a combination
of regulatory reforms and enactment of legislative and judicial barriers to
enforcement mechanisms.2 Despite the acknowledged importance of information
to the functioning of efficient markets, the SEC has increasingly deregulated
disclosure over the last two decades, partly for political reasons, and partly as an
accommodation to globalization.' In addition, private litigation barriers have
exacerbated the problem.4 Commentators have justified deregulation of the
I. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., PuB. No. GAO-03-138, REGULATORY RESPONSES AND
REMAINING CHALLENGES 4 [hereinafter GAO Report]. The GAO Report found that between
January 1997 and June 2002, 10% of all listed companies announced at least one financial
statement restatement. Id. The Report finds a significant growth in fraudulent financial
misrepresentations (showing 165% growth in financial statement restatements due to prior
misrepresentations). Id. at 17. During this time period, the size of the typical restating company
rose from an average (median) of $500 million ($143 million) in 1997 to $2 billion ($351 million)
in 2002. Id. Issues involving revenue recognition accounted for nearly 38% of these restatements.
Id. at 5.
2. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2002) (noting that "[riecent
corporate frauds occurred following 1990s laws scaling back potential liability for corporate
fraud"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, " 57 Bus.
LAW. 1403, 1409 (2002) (noting the deregulatory movement during the 1990s that sought to
dismantle arguably obsolete regulatory provisions).
3. For example, Stephen Bainbridge, who argues in favor of deregulation, points to private
securities litigation as a reason that mandatory disclosure is unnecessary. Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Mandatory Disclosure: A BehavioralAnalysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1033 (2000) (arguing for
deregulation on the basis of the status quo bias of behavioral economics). What Bainbridge fails
to address, however, are the severe impediments to private antifraud enforcement posed by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).
4. The PSLRA (with its increased pleading standards) combined with judicial hostility to
plaintiffs' civil actions, which make it more difficult for shareholders to remedy and deter
nondisclosure, place huge obstacles against anti-fraud litigation and dismantle necessary safeguards
to prevent corporate overreaching. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description
of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65
[Vol. 37:141
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securities industry using economics and game theoretic arguments. Their theory
is that the market will force the evolution of efficient norms.- However, a proper
game theoretic analysis suggests that the defections6 of Enron, WorldCom and
their ilk are predictable outcomes from deregulation. Further, Congress's
proposed solution is unlikely to fix the problem. Both game theory and the
complementary insights of cognitive psychology suggest that the corporate
governance measures dictated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are an unrealistic and
ineffective answer to the current financial scandals. Tracing the deregulatory
impact on both public and private enforcement mechanisms, this Article argues
that even the most efficient markets need strong investor protections,7 and
U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 11 (1996). Some scholars contend that PSLRA has not decreased the level of
meritorious filings, but their results are inconclusive. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (noting the many
variables that may affect the number of filings, and noting that "while it is difficult to assess the
claim that there is more fraud now than there was prior to the PSLRA, the other explanations for
the apparent increase in filings appear to be inadequate"); Ribstein, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that
"reduced liability risk may have encouraged fraudulent or shirking behavior in marginal situations
where defrauding insiders or lax auditors had persuaded themselves that the likelihood of detection
was low ... [which] argues for reversing some aspects of PSLRA"). PSLRA was followed by the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2000). See,
e.g., Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that SLUSA
applied to a class action alleging misrepresentations in the sale of annuity contracts, which activated
removal); In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 263 F.3d 795,799-801 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that Congress was funneling class-action securities litigation into the federal courts). The Supreme
Court has also had a part in diminishing enforcement, through its decision in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that private fraud
actions under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 cannot be brought under an aiding and abetting theory).
5. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing from a game theoretic perspective
that the market will force the evolution of efficient norms, making regulation unnecessary); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure andthe Protection of Investors, 70 VA.
L. REV. 669, 682 (1984) (arguing from a law and economics perspective for deregulation); see also
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1911, 1939-40 (1996) (contending that under conditions of efficiency anonlegal sanctioning system
will be sufficient).
6. Defection is a term used by game theorists to express a self-interested strategy that is
strictly dominant in prisoner's dilemma games, in that it is the best choice for a player given every
possible choice by another player. See DOUGLAS C. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 36
(1994) (a "strictly dominant" strategy is the best choice for a player given every possible move by
another player). In the context of issuer/investor interactions, the self-interested moves (defections)
consist of management self-dealing and director passivity and nondisclosure.
7. See generally JoHN McMILLAN, ANATuRAL HISTORY OF MARKETS (2002) (arguing that
for markets to thrive in a socially productive manner, they require constant government tinkering;
and explaining that "the efficacy of the stock market varies with how activist the government is in




contends that the resulting vacuum created a climate ripe for corporate
malfeasance.
In response to these corporate debacles (and to Enron in particular), Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act," and directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to engage in rulemaking to address the perceived problems.9
Among other changes, the Act requires increased independence of auditors,
directors, and analysts; beefing up the disclosures required in annual reports; and
changing accounting rules that permit special purpose entities to disguise losses.
Congress's principal solution regarding corporate governance was to place the
firm's audit committee in charge of the relationship between the firm and its
auditors." In addition, the audit committee must monitor a system of internal
accounting controls-put in place by the chief executive and chief financial
officers-to ensure that the flow of information reaches them." Each annual
report must contain an internal control report.'2 Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
makes the audit committee responsible for corporate financial disclosures. 3
This legislative response is unlikely to accomplish the necessary change.
Although financial information, current business developments, and future plans
are foundational information for investor decisionmaking, 4 the dynamics of
8. See Michael Schroeder, The Economy: SEC Orders New Disclosures on Company
Earnings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at A2 ("Responding to recent corporate scandals... federal
securities regulators ordered new disclosure rules to clamp down on an accounting practice that
companies have increasingly used to paint rosy financial results.... The changes were ordered by
Congress under the S-0 Act, a sweeping corporate accounting-overhaul law ... ").
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; cf Enron Fallout:
Public Policy Consequences of Enron's Collapse, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. S-5 (BNA) (Mar. 4,
2002) (discussing proposed changes).
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301. The auditor is to be hired by and report directly to the audit
committee, which must be composed of independent directors, at least one of whom must be a
financial expert. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407 (noting that if the audit committee has no financial
expert it must disclose the reasons for the absence).
1. The chief executive officer and chief financial officer must set up a compliance system,
and certify that they have disclosed any deficiencies, fraud, or significant changes in the internal
controls to the auditors and the audit committee. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(4)-(6). The chief
executive officer and chief financial officer must certify in each annual and quarterly report that
they have reviewed the report, that it is true (to their knowledge), that the financial statements and
other financial information fairly present the financial condition of the company, that they have
established and maintain internal controls designed to ensure that material information is made
known to them (and any deficiencies have been disclosed to the auditor and the audit committee).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302.
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.
13. See Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 § 301(4)(A) (the credit committee must establish procedures
for resolving complaints about financial matters); § 301(2) (the audit committee must resolve
disagreements between auditors and management); § 302 (CEO and CFO must report to audit
committee deficiencies, fraud, or significant changes in internal control system).
14. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICs 300 (2002)
[Vol. 37:141
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small group interactions illuminate the problematic aspects of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act's attempts to achieve accountability through compliance programs and
independent directors. Directors undertake decisions and actions as a group.15
This decisionmaking context has important consequences for any attempt to
resolve the agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and
control. 6 Group decisions, while offering many advantages over individual
decisions, have limitations as well. Simply putting independent directors in
charge of monitoring the corporation will not solve the problems inherent in
group decisionmaking, as evolutionary game theory and cognitive psychology
demonstrate.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Following the Introduction, Part I
outlines the theoretical basis for a mandatory disclosure regime in securities law,
the bureaucratic problem of ensuring that those who are nominally in charge of
corporate decisions have access to the kinds of information they need, and the
congressional solution of placing the audit committee in charge of corporate
compliance. Part II discusses evolutionary game theory and the importance of
regulatory structure for optimal social gains to occur. Part III discusses the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's solution of internal control system disclosure and explores
the dynamics of organizational behavior in the context of financial reporting
decisions under conditions of financial stress. Drawing on evolutionary game
theory and cognitive psychology, Part IV proposes a self-insurance solution for
large publicly held corporations that would cover independent directors' liability
for financial misrepresentations that involved recklessness (but not self-dealing).
This Article concludes that undermining enforcement mechanisms and
decreasing disclosure obligations may have the kinds of adverse consequences
the Enron implosion exemplifies. Law has an important function not only in
solving information asymmetries, but also in altering players' incentives to make
socially valuable transactions more likely and in channeling behavior. Both
regulation and private enforcement are important components of efficient capital
markets.
(observing that no one seriously disputes the importance of information as a solution to the basic
agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J.
1027, 1039 (1995) (discussing the disclosure increasing effect of liability rules).
15. For example, the Delaware Code provides that the "vote of the majority of the directors
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors unless
the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws shall require a vote of a greater number." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2002).
16. The agency problem is a result, as Bearle and Means explained, of the separation of
management and control. ADOLF A. BEARLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) ("The separation of ownership from control produces a condition
where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge .... ).
2003]
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I. THE PROBLEM CONGRESS TRIED TO SOLVE
A. Divergent Incentives
In his article, The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase explained that a firm
substitutes bureaucracy, hierarchy, and fiat for contract as a method of reducing
transaction costs.' 7 Businesses coordinate individuals who specialize, and whose
activities relate to each other. 8 The problem is that the interests of these
individuals may not always be aligned, creating agency costs. The arguments for
imposing duties on corporate managers (officers and directors) on behalf of the
shareholders are articulated either as a principal/agent relationship-which is
problematic, because the director/shareholder relationship lacks most of the
attributes of such a relationship 9 -or as a "nexus of contracts," in which the
other firm participants demand contracts with the firm for payment before any
payment can be made to the shareholders."0
Under the nexus of contracts theory, shareholders get to elect directors and
impose fiduciary duties as an implied contractual exchange for accepting higher
risk.2 Under either concept, the interests of the residual claimants (the
17. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386-405 (1937).
18. Thus, the corporation is said to be a nexus of contracts, with its predominant feature being
the separation of ownership and control. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW I (1999). The shareholders, who own the firm, and
the managers, who run it, have divergent interests. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1471 (1989).
19. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 409-11 (2001) (describing the fallacy of seeing the
relationship as a principal/agent relationship). For example, shareholders, unlike principals, have
no power to initiate corporate action, their vote is limited to choosing directors and to extraordinary
board actions. Id.
20. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 20
(1992) (discussing the theory of the firm as a "nexus of contracts, treaties, and understandings
among the individual members of the organization"); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 410
(describing shareholder primacy under economic theories as a consequence of seeing the
relationship as a principal/agent relationship, but contending that the better theory of the firm is as
a nexus of contracts, in which "nonshareholder participants in the firm (including bondholders,
managers, and employees) demand contracts that require them to be fully compensated out of any
revenues earned by the enterprise before any payments can be made to shareholders").
21. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18 (describing the theory of the firm as a nexus
of contracts with shareholders as residual claimants). This is the shareholder primacy model of
corporate structure. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 10, 29. The director primacy model, on the
other hand, sees the corporate bureaucracy as dominated by professional managers, with the
directors acting as mere figureheads, and the shareholders as being largely irrelevant. Under this
model, the directors are only accountable for increasing shareholder wealth. Whether in fact this
is what happens, the laws of every state place a monitoring function on the board and fiduciary
duties that run to the shareholders.
[Vol. 37:141
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shareholders), the centralized management, and the monitors may diverge and
monitors may shirk or self-deal (the classic problem of agency costs)." The
corporate structure contemplates decisionmaking by professional manager's fiat,
monitored by the board, in which the board acts and the shareholders react." If
an entity chooses the corporate form, all states place directors at the apex of the
decisionmaking structure. 4 In other words, the board has the power to monitor
and discipline management, to make policy, and to demand access to resources,
such as legal and accounting advice." Shareholders have the power to withdraw,
vote, and enforce duties owed to them.26
Acknowledging that shareholders have such rights does not necessarily imply
a regime of director liability. One of the common arguments against a
shareholder primacy model is that because shareholders can reduce their risk by
diversifying, there is no need for a rule of director liability." This view contends
that all directors should only be responsible for maximizing shareholder wealth,
and if they fail to do so, the shareholders should sell. There are three responses
to this argument. First, as Stephen Bainbridge explains, management misconduct
is not a diversifiable risk." Risk is defined by reference to the variance on
return.29 Misconduct does not affect variance, it erodes expected return.3"
Second, a steady flow of truthful information into the primary and secondary
22. See BEARLE & MEANS, supra note 16, at 6.
23. The Delaware Code places the nexus of contracts squarely on the directors, requiring that
the corporation's "business and affairs ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors .. " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2002). For a discussion of the nexus theory,
see BA[NBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 197-204. The concept of a monitoring board, although accepted
by state corporation statutes, is controversial in practice. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent
Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1048 (1993).
For example, when Melvin Eisenberg attempted to create the concept of a monitoring board in the
ALl Principles of Corporate Governance project, it created such a storm of controversy that he was
forced to drop the word "monitoring" from the ALl. Id. at 1048.
24. This is probably not the reality of the situation. Most decisions undoubtedly are
delegated except for extraordinary decisions. As the Enron directors explained to the congressional
investigators, they had what was essentially a part-time job. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 17.
25. See, e.g., MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 314 (noting that "[i]f any group could
be considered to have residual control in a corporation, perhaps it might be the board of directors
... [who] have the power to set dividends; to hire, fire, and set the compensation of the senior
executives; to decide to enter new lines of business; to reject merger offers or instead approve and
submit them to the stockholders; and so on").
26. See id. at 508 (discussing the shareholder options of exit and voice).
27. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 263 (articulating the portfolio rationale for the
business judgment rule).
28. See id. at 263 n.31.
29. See MILGRoM & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 461 ("Risk is measured by the variance of
the investment returns or their standard deviation (the square root of the variance).").
30. See BA1NBRIDGEsupra note 14, at 263 n.31.
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markets helps these markets grow." If the market can effectively price, it can
effectively allocate capital investment.32 Capital will flow in the direction
indicated by prices.33 If there is undisclosed management fraud, investors and
society suffer. Thus, sanctions are an important way of deterring misconduct.
In addition, because it is common knowledge that directors and managers have
incentives to withhold bad news, law gives them a way of assuring the market
that they will not withhold it. Moreover, by telling issuers what information
must be disclosed, regulation serves a channeling function.
Only the strongest form of the efficient market hypothesis suggests that stock
prices reflect the securities' intrinsic value.34 Even voluntary disclosure
advocates acknowledge the importance of disclosure." Withholding information,
or providing incorrect information, is not an option for efficient markets.
Voluntary disclosure theorists simply argue that market forces will provide
sufficient incentives for firms to provide optimal levels of information.3 6 This
argument, however, assumes that capital financing endeavors are infinitely
repeated games in which players can verify information and punish firms that
provide inaccurate or too little information.3 ' Game theory explains, however,
31. If accurate information is not made rapidly available, the markets flounder. See, e.g.,
Marc 1. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws: Good for the
Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347,347 (2002) (noting that "[r]elatively efficient trading markets are
based on a disclosure regime where transactions are expeditiously executed and competitively
priced").
32. Empirical studies ofstock prices before and after the announcement of a significant event
show not only that stock prices respond, but that they do so rapidly (as they idid, for example,
following Enron's announcement that its earnings would have to be restated for the past four years).
33. The price of stock, according to the efficient market hypothesis, reflects a consensus of
market participants about the present value of a future income stream. Although the efficient
market hypothesis supports the rapid incorporation of publicly available information into the stock
prices, this presupposes that information is made available. See, e.g., Ma.GROM & ROBERTS, supra
note 20, at 467-69 (explaining that the efficient market hypothesis, under the strong form-which
says stock prices reflect all information-or the moderate form-which says that stock prices reflect
all publicly available information-means that stock price is a proxy for managerial performance).
34. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets 11, 46 J. FIN. 1575(1991). The strong form
of the efficient market hypothesis has been challenged by empirical studies showing that "variations
in stock prices were much too large to be explained as responses to changing expectations about
future dividends." MILOROM & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 470 (citing studies). Empirical support
for the weak form of efficiency--that publicly available information is incorporated rapidly into the
price of stock-has support. See id. ("The most recent econometric studies tend to support the view
that the Weak Form Efficient Market Hypothesis is not fully consistent with the evidence, but that
the deviations from pricing efficiency are not so great as to contradict the hypothesis 'grossly."').
35. See EASTERBROOK & Fisci-E, supra note 18, at 288-89.
36. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1939-40 (contending that under conditions of
efficiency a nonlegal sanctioning system will work).
37. See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End.
The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 691 (1999) (noting that voluntary
[Vol. 37:141
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that verifying information is a classic problem. Even sophisticated shareholders
may have difficulty discerning whether financial statements are inaccurate.38
Third, the inability of the market to verify on a timely basis when defection
has occurred means that sanctions will not be able to deter defections. Moreover,
market incentives that sanction companies for misbehavior do not necessarily
affect managerial behavior. In theory, poor managerial decisions should be
reflected, at least after the fact, in stock prices, placing managers who make poor
decisions in danger of being replaced. 9 However, because the market cannot
distinguish between the consequences of managerial decisions and forces outside
of management control, monitoring price is not equivalent to monitoring
managerial performance. It is difficult to distinguish or differentiate managerial
performance from breach.4 Bad decisions and good decisions with bad
consequences are hard for the market to distinguish.4' Moreover, it may be that
the reason the price declined had more to do with information about the firm than
about the decisional performance of its managers.42
In addition, noise theory suggests that although stock prices reflect
disclosure theory is based on "two central assumptions ... that companies and the market are
playing an infinitely repeated game in which the benefits of cheating once are far outweighed by
the reputational costs or other non-legal sanctions the company will have to bear in later
transactions . . . [and] that the market can verify when the company has cheated it"). The
assumption that raising capital is an infinitely repeated game is somewhat problematic, since, as
Lynn Stout pointed out, it is a rare occurrence for corporations to raise capital through new equity.
See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MicH. L. REV. 613, 644-51 (1988). Nevertheless, firms are
repeat players in the market in the sense that even private funding sources will be monitoring stock
price. See Gulati, supra, at 730 n. 160 (observing that "stock price can probably affect secondary
sources of funds such as the private debt market"). Indeed, Enron's ability to obtain financing was
linked to its stock price and that was the trigger for its bankruptcy.
38. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275, 1338 (2002) (noting that despite the opacity of Enron's financial statements,
investment professionals failed to question them).
39. See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of
Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in IssuEs IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 183-88
(Franklin R. Edwards, ed. 1979) (explaining ways in which markets monitor managers); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Shaping Force of Corporate Law in the New Economic Order, 31 U. RICH. L. REV.
1473, 1486 (1997) (acknowledging that stock prices are "noisy" and "imperfect signals" in
monitoring managers).
40. See Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHm. L. REV. 941, 959
(2002) (arguing that although "an increase in stock price ... should have defeated a claim for
liability and damages" under corporate law, a decline in stock prices does not "establish or even
suggest that the corporate managers who made the decision should be liable in damages").
41. Id.
42. Id. at 960 (contending that if the decisional "goal is otherwise lawful, and no other
grounds exist... for attacking what managers did, the lower stock price should be irrelevant").
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information, they do so with some over- and under-reaction.43 As a result, prices
are an imperfect surrogate for managerial behavior." Share prices do not
necessarily provide guidance in evaluating corporate decisions.45
Thus, assuming shareholders have the power to enforce their contractual
rights, they need to have information about how well the directors are performing
their oversight duties.46 Disclosure is said to be the essence of the fiduciary
43. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857-72 (1992); Robert Leroy, Efficient
Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J. ECON. Lrr. 1583, 1612 (1989)(remarking that "by renaming
irrational trading 'noise' trading, [Fischer Black, who coined the term] avoided the 1-word, thereby
sanitizing irrationality and rendering it palatable to many analysts"). Not only do many investors
ignore the supposed efficiency of the markets in their investment behavior, commonly believing
stocks to be mispriced, see, e.g., Barber & Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000), but they also
act as a herd, following the latest trends and rumors (as evident by the tech boom of the past five
years and Greenspan's frequent tirades against the irrational exuberance of the markets). See JOHN
M. KEYNEs, THEGENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT, INTERESTAND MONEY 156(1936) (describing
Keynes' theory that stock prices reflect investors' herd behavior and strategic assessments of what
the crowd would do). Although the EMH predicts that over- or under-reactions of pricing to
information will be short lived, because arbitragers will take advantage of the mispricing, this turns
out--empirically--not to be the case, because of the impossibility of predicting when the
mispricing will cease. See, e.g., Gulati, supra note 37 (noting "empirical evidence showing that
financial markets both under- and overreact to information about firms") (citing studies). These
observations indicate that prices do not move smoothly to some equilibrium point reflecting their
intrinsic value. See Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and Security Markets Under- and
Overreacting, 53 J. FIN. 1839 (1998). For example, a study of 66,000 accounts at a discount
brokerage found that the most frequent traders received a return of 11.4%, the samples' average
return was 16.4%, and the market return during the study period was 17.9%. See Barber & Odean,
Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual
Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000).
44. See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1343-44 (1996) (arguing that stock prices are an
inadequate measure ofperformance); Andrei Schleiffer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader
Approach to Finance, 4 1. ECON. PERSP. 19, 19-33 (1990) (describing noise theory).
45. See Noel Gaston, Efficiency Wages, Managerial Discretion, and the Fear of Bankruptcy,
33 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 41, 42 (1997) (noting that a number of recent theoretical models are
based on the "recognition that share prices do not necessarily provide perfect guidance in evaluating
corporate decisions").
46. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (explaining that final monitoring authority is given
to the residual claimants in order to encourage detection and punishment of shirking). The firm's
nominal owners, the shareholders, have delegated control over daily operations and long-term
policy to directors, who in turn delegate these powers to firm managers, because of the monitoring
difficulty. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 512 (discussing the impediments to shareholder
democracy).
[Vol. 37:141
REGULATING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
obligation,47 and shareholders will need a mechanism other than the power to
withdraw in order to enforce it. Disclosure, however, is not an unlimited
obligation.48 Rather, a duty to disclose arises only if a statute or regulation
requires disclosure, or if a corporation makes incomplete or misleading
disclosures.49
The securities laws place disclosure obligations on corporate managers and
directors in the form of reporting obligations and liability under the antifraud
provisions.5" State law regulates disclosure through the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty. Because the businessjudgment rule protects even bad decisions of the
board, however, the duty of care means only that the directors must engage in a
good faith decision process and disclose the process that they utilized." In
addition, directors who have a duty to disclose may not knowingly or deliberately
fail to disclose facts that they know are material. 2 The duty of loyalty prohibits
director (and manager) self-dealing, which means that for a board decision to be
self-interested, a majority of the board must be materially affected by the
decision in a way not shared by the firm or the shareholders." Most importantly,
for liability to ensue, the decision must not have been approved by the
shareholders after full disclosure. 4
47. Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of
Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 69 (2000) (explaining that "disclosure is the essence of the duty
of a fiduciary").
48. As the Supreme Court explained in the context of the duty to disclose or abstain from
trading, mere possession of material nonpublic information does not trigger a duty to disclose.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
49. Id.
50. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) ("Silence, absent a duty to
disclose, is not misleading .... ).
51. See BAINBRDGE, supra note 14, at 297 (discussing the "sticking point ... [as] the
adequacy of disclosure" because "Ii]t is hard to imagine a board disclosure along the lines of:
'we're very sorry but we violated the duty of care in the following particulars, which we now
describe at great length,").
52. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 992-93 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
(discussing the necessity of a duty to disclose before triggering the exception for knowingly or
deliberately failing to disclose material facts under Delaware Code provision section 102(b)(7) that
permits corporations to exculpate directors for breaches of fiduciary duty).
53. Directors are deemed disinterested when they "neither appear on both sides of a
transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing,
as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally."
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). See also Rales v. Blasband,
634 A.2d 927,936 (Del. 1993) (stating "[d]irectorial interest also exists where a corporate decision
will have a materially detrimental impact on a director, but not on the corporation and the
stockholders").
54. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,890 (Del. 1985) (stating that failure to disclose
material information, including the "fact that the Board had no reasonably adequate information
indicative of the intrinsic value of the Company" made shareholder ratification unavailing).
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Whether the underlying misconduct was self-dealing or complete lack of
oversight, the disclosure problem is nearly always going to be misrepresentation
by the board about their decision process or action, or a failure to disclose the
basis for their decision." From these basic precepts, the duty of candor and the
duty to disclose arise. 6 These duties acknowledge the widely divergent
incentives with respect to disclosure between corporations and their managers
and investors: investors uniformly prefer more; directors and managers would
prefer to withhold adverse information or information that could affect the firm's
competitive situation (and their own self-interests), while disclosing favorable
information to attract investors."
In order to trigger a disclosure duty, however, the directors must have
information to disclose or be reckless in failing to obtain it." The problem in
large organizations is how to ensure a flow of information both to those who
manage the daily operations of the firm and to those who invest in the firm. A
further problem is how to make those managing the firm accountable for acting
(or failing to act) on the information they obtain, without unduly undermining the
discretionary authority firm managers need to make the firm profitable. 9
Ensuring that information reaches the directors is the basis for the Sarbanes-
55. As Professor Langevoort explains it, "by exposing the 'lemons' in the market basket via
well-enforced disclosure requirements, it creates an environment in which both markets and the
better issuers and managers can flourish." Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's
Shadow: The SEC s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 489 (2001)
(arguing that securities law and state corporate law have complementary aims in controlling agency
costs in the public corporation).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) (stating that an agent has the duty to
disclose all matters relating to the agency).
57. Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities
Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 85-86 (1999).
58. Hence the protestations of the Enron board members that they knew nothing about the
dire straits of the corporation and that management withheld key information from them. See
Report of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the Role of the Board of
Directors in Enron's Collapse, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 9 (2002) [hereinafter Enron Report].
59. See generally Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW.
461 (1992) (explaining the central corporate governance question as achieving the proper mix of
accountability and discretion). This is the reason for the business judgment rule in state corporation
law. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that
because shareholders "shouldn't rationally want" directors to be risk averse, the courts will abstain
from interfering with business decisions); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 US. 1051 (1983) (noting that "the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain
voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions"). Even bad decisions are virtually
unreviewable, absent fraud, self-dealing, and such utter abdication of oversight responsibilities as
to amount to aiding and abetting. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J.
1981) (holding duty of care requires directors to inform themselves about the affairs of the firm, so
that a widow on notice from her deceased husband that her sons were liable to loot the company
was under a duty to take action to prevent the loss).
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Oxley Act's mandate that managers establish and maintain internal controls, and
disclose their evaluation of the corporate compliance program.6"
B. Financial Misrepresentation: What Enron Didn't Say
The special purpose entities that ultimately destroyed Enron are a common
type of asset securitization, involving a transaction between a selling company
and an entity created for the sole purpose of buying its assets.6 In accounting
terms, the asset moves off the selling company's books, and is frequently
followed by a swap agreement, in which the seller reassumes risks tied to the
asset.62 Enron engaged in a number of these transactions, with a twist.63 Its swap
agreements tied buyback provisions to its stock value, and permitted Enron to
retain abnormally high risks.64 Instead of using these entities for "legitimate
purposes of achieving asset-liability matching, lowering funding costs, or
improving liquidity," Enron used these entities to achieve an accounting result
lacking in economic substance.65
Hundreds of millions of dollars a year were kept off the Enron balance sheets
by using these special purpose entities.66 The Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) is trying to close such loopholes by requiring that off-balance
sheet partnerships be consolidated in the parent company's books unless there is
an investment by outside parties equaling 10% of the total capital (the former
60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302. Notably, reporting companies already had to
implement accounting controls under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1934 Securities Exchange
Act § 13(b)(2)(A) (which required issuers to keep records "which, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer") and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act § 13(b)(2)(B) (which required issuers to maintain a system of internal
financial controls to assure that transactions are properly authorized and that issuers have reliable
information). No scienter is required in order to prove a violation of these requirements. SEC v.
World-Wide Coin lnvs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749-50 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Rule 13b2-1,
promulgated under § 13(b)(2), prohibits falsification of the books and records of reporting
companies. Id. at 746. Moreover, internal controls are effectively required under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which permit the existence of an effective system to be a mitigating factor
in sentencing. UNrTED STATES SENTENCINGGUIDELINES § 8C2.5(f) (2002) (reducing base fines by
up to 60%).
61. Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor, 88 A.B.A.J. 40, 42 (2002).
62. See id. at 42 (arguing that although such transactions may "sound suspect," they are
"valid financial constructions---so long as the seller company and the SPE are independent of each
other and the SPE has assumed the risks a buyer would normally assume").
63. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or
Dormant?, I I J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101, 112 (2002) (discussing Enron's use of special purpose
entities to manipulate accounting disclosures).
64. Davis, supra note 61, at 42.
65. Kip Betz, Securitizations: Panelists Call SPEs Legitimate Tool; Only Small Portion Used
Improperly, SEC. L. DAILY, Mar. 31, 2002, at D7.
66. 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. S-1l (BNA) (Mar. 4, 2002).
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rules required only 3% outside investment).67 Also in the works are new rules
regarding guarantees and accompanying obligations, with a proposal that the
guarantor stand ready to perform over the term of the guarantee in the event of
adverse financial conditions and accompanying future payments.6" If guarantees
or other arrangements shield investors from losses, the structure would have to
be consolidated.69
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has much tougher
rules for off-balance sheet reporting.70 Had the United States adopted the IASB
rules, Enron would have had to disclose its special purpose entities."' Even so,
IASB Chair David Tweedie acknowledged that "there may be ways in which the
[international] rules could be 'strengthened or clarified."'7 "
Enron not only failed to disclose its financial instability, it also failed to
reveal multiple layers of conflicts of interest." For example, in order to improve
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Steve Burkholder, Accounting: FASB to Address Financial "Conduits" in SPE Effort;
Work on Guarantees Continues, BANKING DAILY, Mar. 17, 2002, at D6.
70. See Patrick Tracey, Accounting: Global Standard Sellers Shift Focus to Debts Left Off
Balance Sheets, Pension & Benefits Daily Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 21, 2002).
71. See Questioning the Books: Enron Hoped to Sway Accounting Group, WALL ST. J., Feb.
14, 2002, at A8 (opining that "[h]ad the U.S. adopted the IASB's stricter rules, Enron would have
been required to disclose [its special purpose entities] in financial statements").
72. Tracey, supra note 70. Although the SEC is considering the move toward international
accounting standards-recognizing that a single system promotes transparency by permitting
investors to compare the financial statements of different companies-it nonetheless continues to
insist on reconciliation with GAAP. SECURITIES & ExCHANGE COMMISSION, No. 7801, CONCEPT
RELEASE: REQUEST FOR COMMENT: INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (2000). There are a number
of important areas of disagreement between GAAP and the international standards, including
differences in recognition, measurement, reporting requirements, and presentation. Financial
Accounting Standards Board, The IASC-US. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities
and Differences between 1ASC Standards and US GAAP 41 (1999). Notably, accounting
recognition criteria are currently the subject of much dispute in the Enron case, with auditors calling
for revisions of the GAAP requirements. Of particular concern in the Enron case was the use of
special-purpose entities that can be left off the consolidated books of a parent company as long as
3% of their capital comes from outsiders. Daniel Kadlec, The [Enron] Spillover, TIME, Feb. 4,
2002, at 28. The SEC may want to revisit its position on GAAP, which is frequently criticized as
being too historically (rather than current market) based. Dynegy, Mirant and General Electric Co.
have all boosted disclosure relating to special purpose entities in their annual reports, even in the
absence of new regulation-though perhaps in anticipation of foreseeable future regulation. See
Rachel Emma Silverman, GE's Annual Report Bulges with Data in Bid to Address Post-Enron
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2002, at A3 (noting that "GE went out of its way to distinguish
its off-balance sheet practices from Enron's"); Accounting: Dynegy and Mirant Enhance Valuation
Disclosure in Andersen-Audited 10-Ks, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Mar. 18, 2002, at 8.
73. Rachel McTague, Congress: Lieberman Calls Hearings on Enron on Senate Side to Look
at Government Role, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. 5 (BNA), at 5 (Jan. 7, 2002).
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the appearance of Enron's finances, debt was transferred to undisclosed
partnerships run by Enron executives in which officers had a personal stake.74
By sharing directors with the entities it created, Enron violated the cardinal
principle of corporate independence that validates special purpose entities." In
addition, the partnerships were used to enrich Enron executives while they were
supposedly representing Enron in negotiating self-dealing transactions.76 New
rules are being considered to require independence of equity investors, a rule that
Enron would have violated due to the heavy investment of its then-chief financial
officer, Andrew Fastow, and his colleagues.7
Inflating revenue is a widespread problem, as evidenced by investigations of
Computer Associates International (for questionable accounting practices that
enriched top executives),78 CMS Energy (for counting sham energy trades as
revenue), Dynegy (for sham energy trades), Global Crossing (for trading fiber
optic capacity in order to record sales that were never made), Halliburton (for
booking cost overruns as revenue although it might not be paid for the excess),
Quest Communications International (for creating trades in fiber optic capacity
that had no economic value), Reliant Resources (questionable energy trades),
Waste Management (falsifying earnings), and Xerox (for including future
payments on existing contracts in its current revenue)." These companies
frequently argue that they are observing the technicalities of GAAP.
Nonetheless, their practices fail to disclose the true financial picture.
Moreover, recent studies show that managers are manipulating disclosure to
increase their own compensation.° They can do this because performance-based
compensation, originally conceived to better align management and investor
74. Enron Report, supra note 58, at 12, 21 (observing that on three occasions the board
approved the creation of special purpose entities, which were partly owned and wholly managed
by Enron executives, to do business with Enron, and that each time the presentations of these
entities and their transactions were described "in light of their favorable impact on Enron's
financial statements").
75. Davis, supra note 61, at 42. For a discussion of the role of special purpose entities in
Enron's collapse, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special
Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309, 1314-15 (2002).
76. Enron Report, supra note 58, at 26, 27 (noting conflicts arising from the substantial
profits that accrued to Enron executives transacting business through the "internal Enron
marketplace").
77. Davis, supra note 61, at 42.
78. Gaston F. Ceron, Staying Focused: Corporate Governance May Be Everybody's
Responsibility; But at Some Companies, One Person Has More Responsibility Than Others, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R7 (finding the "software maker has been bruised by criticism of its
executive compensation practices... [and an SEC] investigation into its accounting [practices]").
79. Laura S. Egodigwe et al., A Year ofScandals and Sorrow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at
RIO.
80. Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize




interests, is now a dominant form of pay in the United States and other
industrialized countries.8' The reality is that these packages unduly favor
management.2 Performance based compensation coupled with stock option
grants have increased executive compensation far out of proportion to any actual
increase in economic growth.83
This is an important issue. Using stock option compensation to align
officers' interests with those of shareholders doesn't work. 4 Any incentive to
look after shareholder interests can be defeated by the possibility of stock sales,
hedging through derivatives, manipulation of earnings accruals on the books, and
timed disclosures of bad news. These are agency costs-incentives for self-
dealing-imposed by managers on the firm and its principals, injuring firm
prospects, value and credibility. In Enron, management, including directors, held
offdisclosure of massive lossesjust long enough to unload a fair quantity of their
stock.85
Enron's auditors also failed to disclose conflicts of interest which arose from
their stake in selling the special entity partnerships as investment vehicles. 6
8 1. Stuart Weinberg, Insiders Hedge With Zero-Cost Collars, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at
B5 (noting that "[many executive-pay packages include company shares in order to link
executives' interests to the fortunes of the companies they manage").
82. Kathy M. Kristof, CEOs Paid 70% More at Firms Under Scrutiny Accounting: Top
Officers at 23 Companies Made Well More Than Average, According to a Study, WALL ST. J., Aug.
26, 2002, at C3 (noting the" increasingly controversial practice of paying top executives with stock
options that become valuable only if the company's market price rises [gives] executives the
incentive to inflate profits to drive up their companies' stock prices").
83. Yablon & Hill, supra note 80, at 85. FASB has taken the position that disclosure of
executive stock options in financial statement footnotes is sufficient, and that it is not necessary to
expense stock-based compensation. Nonetheless, it recognizes that "disclosure is not an adequate
substitute for recognition of assets, liabilities, equity, revenues, and expenses in financial
statements." Stock Options, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 4, 2002) (quoting IASB chair
David Tweedie). Further, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which has yet to
set a standard for stock option compensation accounting, has noted that the real questions are
whether it is an expense, and if so, why it does not appear in the income statement.
84. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 755 (2002) (concluding that "managerial
power and rent extraction are indeed likely to play a significant role in executive compensation in
the United States").
85. See Enron Report, supra note 58, at 47-51 (explaining the significant of inadequate
disclosure coupled with lavish stock option bonuses in that "giving Enron executives huge stock
option awards, they might be creating incentives for Enron executives to improperly manipulate
company earnings to increase the company stock price and cash in their options").
86. These special entity partnerships are called trust-preferred securities. Goldman Sachs
pioneered this investment strategy in which a corporation formed a subsidiary (in this case they
were limited partnerships) that issued preferred shares paying a fixed amount to investors; the
proceeds were then loaned to the corporation and treated as an asset. Apparently a change in the
accounting rules is what caused Enron to have to restate its financials to account for these
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They apparently made over $1 million in fees for helping to structure the
transactions, far more than from auditing the company. Enron is not the only
company in which the auditing process failed to reveal impending financial
disaster. Waste Management, Sunbeam, and Microstrategy are only a few of the
firms in which auditors were similarly deficient.8 7 Inadequate disclosure of loans
or losses has surfaced as a major problem in a number of corporations now being
investigated by the SEC, including Adelphia Communications (which failed to
disclose $3.1 billion in loans and loan guarantees to its founder's family), Kmart
(which is being investigated for its loss accounting), Tyco (which may have made
undisclosed loans to its former CEO and other top executives), and Worldcom
(which made more than $400 million in loans to its former CEO).8 Ultimately
these kinds of conflicts of interest affect the financial health of the corporation,
and are information that should be disclosed.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATION
Prior to the spate of corporate fiascos, of which Enron was a part,
deregulation was a popular proposal. Commentators frequently relied on game
theory to justify deregulation of the securities industry. Properly applied,
however, game theory suggests that deregulation actually will lead to the kind of
corporate malfeasance that Enron illustrates. In particular, the branch of iterated
game theory with repeat players known as evolutionary game theory, provides a
useful lens through which to understand the problem of corporate monitoring,
and to assess the role of law in structuring human interactions-in this case, the
decisions made by those in charge of large publicly held corporations.
Evolutionary game theory offers insights into the dynamics of two ,kinds of
interactions that drive corporate governance: interactions between corporate
insiders and investors, and interactions between directors and managers.
A. Basic Game Theory Concepts
Game theory is a way of mathematically modeling strategic interactions.8 9
It attempts to simplify a social interaction in which at least two people (called the
players) must choose a course of action. The result of the game is called a
payoff. The players' choice of strategy will be based on their payoff, and what
the players predict the others will do. Game theory, like conventional economics,
attempts to predict human behavior by ignoring irrelevant details and focusing
on the essence of a particular choice of behavior. Its goal is to predict which
partnerships. See John D. McKinnon, Enron Tax Strategy Opposed by Clinton Draws Scrutiny of
Government Officials, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at A18.
87. Oversight of Accountants and Auditors: SEC Proposes New Regulatory Regime,
Oversight Panel for Accountants, Auditors, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 4, 2002).
88. Hubert B. Herring, An Impossible Dream: Corporate Honesty, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16,
2002, § 3, at 12.
89. For an elegant introduction to game theory (without the mathematical notations), see
BAIRD ET AL., supra note 6.
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strategies the players are likely to choose, and a fundamental assumption is that
players will prefer higher payoffs to lower, taking into account what the other
players are likely to do.9" Game theory assumes that players believe that other
players will also act to optimize their payoffs.9 A strong assumption of game
theory is complete information, which means that the players know the strategies
available to each player and the payoffs to every combination of strategies.92
The combination of strategies in which no player could do better by changing
strategies is known as the Nash equilibrium. 9 3
The best known of the normal form games94 is Prisoner's Dilemma, which
explores whether people can be motivated to behave cooperatively. Two players
must decide whether to cooperate or not; if both cooperate they each receive
90. See id. at 11 (explaining that the idea that each player will choose the best outcome in
light of what the other player is likely to do-that is, a player will choose a dominant strategy over
a dominated strategy-is "the most compelling precept in all of game theory").
91. See id. at 13 (illustrating the concept of iterated dominance through a normal form game
between a pedestrian and motorist in which the available strategies are exercise care or exercise no
care, where exercising care costs both players $10, an accident is certain to happen if neither
exercises care, 10% certain if both exercise care, and an accident costs the pedestrian $100; if
neither exercises care the motorist receives a payoff of $0 and the pedestrian a payoff of $100; if
the motorist exercises no care, but the pedestrian exercises care, the motorist's payoff is $0 and the
pedestrian's is -$110; because not exercising care is a dominant strategy for the motorist, the
pedestrian will predict that is the strategy the motorist will adopt and therefore will not exercise care
either). This model is highly stylized, in that it assumes no legal rule to shift liability, the motorists'
indifference to causing harm, and an absence of harm to the motorist; nonetheless, it predicts that
in a regime of no liability, the motorist will have too little incentive to take optimal care to minimize
accidents. Id. at 14. A change in the legal rules-the game structure-will change the incentives
of both players. Id. at 14-15.
92. Id. at 312. Stag hunt and prisoner's dilemma are examples of games with complete,
though imperfect, information.
93. John Nash, Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 48-49
(1950). In a single play prisoner's dilemma game, for example, there are four possible strategies:
cooperate-cooperate, cooperate-defect, defect-defect, and defect-cooperate. See, e.g., ALEXANDER
J. FIELD, ALTRuIsTIcALLY INCLINED? THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, AND
THE ORIGINS OF RECIPROCITY 2 (2001) (discussing the concept of Nash equilibria). Defect-defect
is the Nash equilibrium in single or finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games Id. at 2. It is not,
however, a pareto optimal solution, in that the good of both players taken as a whole would be
cooperate-cooperate, which would yield six total points rather than the maximum of five for defect-
cooperate. However, from the individual player's standpoint, defection is strictly dominant, in that
it results in a higher payoff regardless of the other player's strategy. See id. at 2 (discussing the
concept of strict dominance).
94. Normal form games are those consisting of the following three elements: players,
strategies and playoffs. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 6, at 311. Two-by-two, or bimatrix games,
consist of two players, each of whom has a small number of strategies, represented by a box of four
squares, the payoffs of which are listed by convention with the row player's first, and the column
player's second. Id. at 303.
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three points; if both defect (by not cooperating), they receive one point each; but
if one player defects and the other cooperates, the defector receives five points
and the cooperator receives zero (the sucker's payoff).95 More total points will
be garnered if they both cooperate, but from either player's standpoint it is better
to defect.96 Under these circumstances, the logical thing to do is defect because
no matter what the other player's choice (cooperate or defect), the payoff will be
better for the defector.97 The Nash equilibrium, the point where no one has an
incentive to deviate from the chosen strategy, is defection by both players.9"
Always Defect is the strategy of rational self-maximizers. This is true whether
the game is played just once or for a set number of repetitions.
There are two inter-related games that this Article is concerned about: the
issuer/investor game and the corporate governance game. The interaction
between the shareholders and the issuer can be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma
game where the overall payoffs for the group would be enhanced by cooperation,
but where the temptation to defect results in payoffs that are far from optional
because the issuer's defect position of grabbing the investors' money will tempt
investors to play their defect position of keeping their money under a mattress.
Thus, the investors' defect position will predominate." It is a prisoner's dilemma
(a kind of collective action problem) because, in a well-functioning, fraud-free
market, the insiders and the investors would both be better off if the investors
invested and the issuer pursued profits rather than creating the illusion of profits.
In the corporate governance game, the players are the corporation's managers
and directors. The role that directors are assigned as firm monitors has dynamics
similar to the well-known agency-regulated firm game, where for the firm
defection means law evasion and for the regulator defection means punitive
enforcement.'00 In the corporate governance game, defection by management
95. Martin A. Nowak et al., Cooperation Versus Competition, 56 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 13, 16
(2000).
96. This example is taken from BAIRD E" AL., supra note 6, at 33.
97. A similar game, Wolf's dilemma, in which twenty people sit in cubicles, with their fingers
on buttons. After ten minutes each person will get $1000 as long as no one pushes a button. If
someone pushes a button before time, that person gets $100 and everyone else gets nothing.
Because there is a small chance that someone will push the button, logic impels each person to try
to be the first pusher. See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICALTHEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE
ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN (1985).
98. See ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DLEMMA (1965).
99. See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 6, at 46 (describing lending as a two-by-two normal
form game in which, absent law, no lending activity will take place). As Baird and his co-authors
conclude, unless there are strong legal protections assuring investors that their money is not going
to be stolen, no money will be invested. Id.
100. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRArrHWArrE, RESPONSIvE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 54, 55 (1992) ("Business regulation is often modeled as a game between
two players--the regulatory agency and the firm."). This inescapably oversimplifies the matter, but
it has advantages of clarifying the dynamics of the interaction. Id. at 55. John Scholz models
business regulation as a prisoner's dilemma, where the motivation of the firm is to decrease
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means evading full disclosure when presenting the board with information upon
which it must take action as a means of decreasing costs of compliance.'0 '
Defection by directors means refusal to ratify management decisions, or in the
extreme case, firing management, motivated by attempts to achieve maximum
compliance with shareholder protections." 2
In a single prisoner's dilemma game, one would expect both sides to defect,
that is, for management to attempt to hide information from the board that would
contradict management's desired outcome, and the board to insist on full
disclosure regarding the impact of management proposals on shareholders.
Presumably, that insight is the reason for having a board in the first place. As the
regulatory costs and the motivation of the regulator is to maximize compliance. John T. Scholz,
Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAW&SOC'Y REV. 179,
192 (1984).
101. To the detriment of shareholders, not all managers are exclusively motivated by their own
self-interest. As Ayres & Braithwaite noted:
[s]ome corporate actors will comply with the law if it is economically rational for them
to do so; most corporate actors will comply with the law most of the time simply
because it is the law; all corporate actors are bundles of contradictory commitments to
values about economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility.
Business executives have profit-maximizing selves and law-abiding selves, at different
moments, in different contexts, the different selves prevail.
AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 100, at 19.
102. Another way of visualizing the game between the directors and managers is a variation
on the prisoner's dilemma, the hawk-dove game. Like prisoner's dilemma, the hawk-dove game
is a two-by-two normal form game. See BAIRD ETAL., supra note 6, at 45. For a description of this
game and its relationship to the generation of oppressive norms, see Amy Wax, Expressive Law and
Oppressive Norms: A Comment on Richard McAdams's "A Focal Point Theory of Expressive
Law," 86 VA. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (2000). This game also emphasizes interactions where the
players can benefit from cooperation but have incompatible claims to resources. Id. The choices
are to be assertive against the other player (play hawk) or to be submissive (play dove). Each
player's first choice is to play hawk while the other plays dove. The second choice is for both the
players to play dove. Third choice is to play dove while the other player plays hawk. Both players
want to avoid playing hawk, because conflict is inevitable, and the costs of losing exceed the
benefits of winning. Neither player knows what the strategy of the other player will be. Although
the role assigned to directors is nominally that of hawk (they are supposed to monitor, after all), in
practical terms they serve at the managers' will. On the other hand, the directors do have the power
(though rarely exercised) to fire management in a disagreement over policy. Therefore, there is
some fluidity in the roles of the players. This suggests that in repeated games, a player that was
hawk may shift to dove and vice versa. Unlike prisoner's dilemma, the hawk-dove game has no
single Nash equilibrium in which the strategy for each player is the best reply to itself. Id. at 1733.
But like prisoner's dilemma, infinite repetition has the potential to change the outcome to a
cooperative strategy. See, e.g., Robert J. Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation
Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 231 (1985) ("What is important
for our purposes is not to focus exclusively on Prisoner's Dilemma per se, but to emphasize the
fundamental problem that it (along with [hawk-dove and stag hunt]) illustrates.").
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following section demonstrates, however, repeat interactions change the outcome
to a cooperative strategy. This has advantages for the public good in the
issuer/investor game, and disadvantages for the public good in the corporate
governance game.
B. Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory combines the idea of evolutionary interactions
with a branch of mathematical economics to demonstrate that human beings are
social animals for whom reciprocity is as important as competition. 3
Competition and cooperation together drive the engines of evolution and
economy."° Evolutionary game theory demonstrates the conditions under which
cooperation will emerge despite a constant urge to defect.105 Rather than strict
competition, an alternative-and more accurate-vision is that of coevolution,
with its emphasis on the importance of initial conditions for cooperation to
flourish and for the gains from trade to be shared.'0 6
The twist that evolutionary game theory adds to the Prisoner's Dilemma
game is that always defecting is not the most successful strategy in games
repeated indefinitely.0 7 An infinite number of strategies is possible for the
103. Evolutionary game theory demonstrates that in paired interactions, rather than strictly
acting to maximize profit, people assess their partner's projected outlook and act in response.
These results are explained by evolutionary biologists as conferring an evolutionary advantage to
a species that lives in groups and can expect future encounters both within the group and with other
groups. Evolutionary biologists theorize that the way human beings think is a product of
evolutionary history, and depends not only on brain structure but also on adaptive responses to the
environment (including other human beings). See generally Nowak et al., supra note 95.
104. See STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE 240 (2000) (noting that "[an
economy, like an ecosystem, is a web of coevolving agents" and explaining the analogy between
evolution and economy in terms of complexity theory).
105. A standard Darwinian economic argument is that whatever economic institutions survive
are presumptively efficient. See Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARv. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996). This is mistaken because, as Roe explains, chaos, path
dependencies, and the concept of local equilibria assure that nothing about survival implies
"superiority to untried alternatives." Id. at 643.
106. One of the key insights of complexity theory is the importance of initial conditions for
self-organization, and the role of positive feedback mechanisms. See RICHARD SOLE & BRIAN
GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE 299 (2000) (arguing that complex systems, such as traffic patterns,
internet use, and by extension, trade transactions, need a "distributed and adaptive set of rules,
always in direct interaction with the internal web dynamics [in order to] ... effect cooperation (and
not conflict) among users"). Cf Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase
Further, 100 YALE L. J. 1211, 1229 (1991) (castigating the use of Pareto "to hide the inevitability
of distribution issues").
107. See Gerald S. Wilkinson, Reciprocal Food Sharing in the Vampire Bat, 308 NATURE 181,
181-84 (1984) (observing that a past blood donator will receive blood from a prior recipient, but
a past refuser will not, and that bats seem to be good at keeping score).
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iterated game."0 8 These repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma illustrate a major
anomaly that undermines the paradigm of self-interested profit maximizing
competition in classic utility theory. Self-interest may include cooperation and
retaliation, neither predicted by utility theory, because such a cooperative
strategy may be more effective in evolutionary terms." 9 Maynard Smith
theorized that a strategy is evolutionarily stable if no differing strategy can
invade a population of repeat players."' Evolutionary game theory thus provides
a bridge between biology and economics by explaining the interaction of
cooperative and competitive behavior."'
Testing this theory, Robert Axelrod devised a series of computer tournaments
to confront populations of strategies in repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma."2
In these tournaments, a strategy called "tit-for-tat" seems to rule." 3 Tit-for-tat
begins by cooperating and then responds in kind to whatever the other player did
the last time." 4 The advantage of tit-for-tat is "its combination of being nice,
retaliatory, forgiving and clear."'" 15 In a computer tournament where nasty
strategies (always defect), nice strategies (always cooperate) and retaliatory
strategies (tit-for-tat) played repeatedly against each other, tit-for-tat prevailed." 6
108. See Karl Sigmund, Automata for Repeated Games, in EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS IN
DEMOCRACiES 335, 336 (Johann Gotschl ed. 2001) (noting in that in the context of iterated games
there are too many Nash equilibria for the concept to provide a solution).
109. See J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price, The Logic ofAnimal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15, 15
(1973) (arguing that in the context of animal conflicts, strategies are hard-wired into genetic modes
of behavior, so that randomly meeting players will play the game according to their genetic
programming; the more successful strategies in a population will predominate because randomly
meeting individual strategies will be tested against each other, and if one strategy is consistently
more successful, it will dominate the population). John Maynard Smith, an evolutionary biologist,
puzzled over this result, and postulated that it was linked to the courting behavior of animals, which
rarely fight to the death in mating contests. Maynard Smith modeled these contests as two-by-two
normal form games known as hawk-dove games. Id. Maynard Smith drew on Darwinian selection
and postulated that this result must be a Nash equilibrium that is stable overtime. He termed the
biological equivalent of the Nash equilibrium an "evolutionary stable strategy" (ESS) in which
natural selection causes animals to behave instinctively with similar strategies. See id. (exploring
why animals do not generally fight to the death and concluding that in repeat games a cooperative
strategy may prevail). Notably, although an ESS is a Nash equilibrium, not all Nash equilibria are
ESS. See FIELD, supra note 93, at 140 (explaining that the best counter to an ESS must be itself).
An ESS cannot be successfully invaded by any other strategy, and it may consist of "more than one
strategy in stable proportions." Id.
I 10. J. MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THETHEORY OFGAMES (1982).
I1 1. See MATT RIDLEY, TIlE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 54 (1996) (explaining developments in the
evolutionary theory of behavior).
112. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
113. WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992).
114. AXELROD, supra note 112, at 6.
115. See id.
116. See RIDLEY, supra note 111, at 61 (detailing the Axelrod computer tournament). This
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Although the success of a tit-for-tat strategy in repeat encounters might
appear to be a good explanation for human cooperation, it is not, because while
cooperation is encouraged by frequent repetition, so is retaliation. If two tit-for-
tatters are playing repetitively, they will cooperate until one defects; but once
defection has begun, a downward spiral of retaliation begins. That is the
downside of tit-for-tat and may explain the incessant tribal feuds in places like
Israel, Ireland, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. " " It also suggests the problems that
a regulatory scheme based primarily on punishment may encounter. 11
This result sparked a great deal of research into reciprocal behavior in the
animal world. 9 Although tit-for-tat is practiced by some animals (notably bats
and reef fish) it is strikingly absent from most of the animal kingdom, an
empirical result that led to further refinements of the Axelrod tournaments.'20 Tit
for Tat only prevails where the conditions for the contest are stable. Where
conditions were made more random,' in an attempt to simulate real world
conditions, a new strategy, a random Tit for Two Tats, prevailed for a while but
then permitted Always Cooperate to prevail-a situation ripe for exploitation by
Always Defect. Thus, this result does not explain human cooperation either,
is possible because Prisoner's Dilemma is not a zero sum game. Even a small minority of tit-for-
tatters can hold its own against a majority of Always Defectors and eventually prevail because, for
the most part, the individual tit-for-tatters will receive slightly less of a payoff than an Always
Defector. However, in the few games against other tit-for-tatters this is more than made up for, and
the more the population oftit-for-tatters grows, the larger the joint payoff. See Sigmund, supra note
108, at 338 (describing the Axelrod tournaments).
117. It may also explain the importance of reputation and other signaling devices. Picking the
right partner to bargain with is crucial. In a world of defectors, tit-for-tat cannot take hold unless
it can find other cooperators. Playing Prisoner's Dilemma with strangers heightens the importance
of trustworthiness signals. One of the reasons people advertise trustworthiness, through facial
expressions, actions, and reputation, is to identify people who are not opportunists and attract them.
ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1988) (explaining the role of emotions in
advertising and identifying trustworthiness).
118. See AYRES & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 100, at 25 (observing that a "mostly punitive
policy ... fosters an organized business subculture of resistance to regulation . .
119. See RIDLEY, supra note I l, at 61.
120. See, e.g., Sigmund, supra note 108, at 339 (introducing the notion of random error).
121. Robert Sugden proposed an asychronous game (for a strategy called "Contrite Tit for
Tat"-which I call Tit for Two Tats), in which a state "good" or "bad" is assigned to each player;
the player chooses to cooperate or defect, and is assigned a new state depending on both the
player's prior move and prior state. ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION
AND WELFARE (1986). Sigmund explains the strategy:
If my opponent was in state g or both players were in b, I achieve state g ifI have played
C, or else b. But if] was in state g while the opponent was in b, then I enter state g, no
matter whether I have played C or D. Hence, ifI play C, I always achieve state g. If I
play D, however, I will get into state g only if, in the previous round, I was in g and
opponent in b.
Sigmund, supra note 108, at 340-41.
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because it is an unstable downward spiral.'22 Nor does it provide much guidance
for how to structure a regulatory game to achieve an optimal balance of
cooperation and competition.
A more stable strategy is Pavlov, a strategy that repays its partners in kind
(like for Tit for Tat), forgiving occasionally (like Tit for Two Tats), but with a
nasty streak that lets it exploit Always Cooperate.'23 A Pavlov player starts with
cooperate and defects in the next round if the opponent's move was different.'24
If both players defected in the prior round, Pavlov tries cooperating; if the
opponent cooperated when Pavlov defected, Pavlov defects again. If Pavlov
cooperated while the opponent defected, Pavlov's next move is defection. This
makes for a stable strategy, because if one player erroneously chooses to defect,
cooperation is reestablished in two rounds. 2 Pavlov's flaw, however, is that in
an Always Defect environment, it cannot prevail. 26
A better strategy is Firm-but-Fair, which is slightly nicer than Pavlov, in that
it "cooperates with cooperators, returns to cooperating after a mutual defection,
and punishes a sucker by further defection, but unlike Pavlov it continues to
cooperate after being the sucker in the previous round.""' The success of Firm-
but-Fair strategy is evolutionarily stable for Prisoner's Dilemma and is a possible
explanation for the evolution of human cooperative behavior.'28 This is because,
when it is surrounded by a population of Always Defect players, Firm-but-Fair
acts like Tit for Tat in that it cannot be duped for more than one round and does
not cooperate again until the loss is made up, but it is better because it does not
need a cooperative population to prevail.' 29 But it does more. It illustrates how
one might view a system that balances minimum regulatory interference with
optimal payoffs.
The studies on the evolution of cooperation may have salutary implications
for the investor/issuer game, because it implies that cooperation may become a
stable strategy over time. On the other hand, it is not so wonderful for the
corporate governance game, because it suggests that directors will tend to be
captured by the managers they are supposed to monitor. 13 The tendency toward
122. RIDLEY, supra note 111, at 77.
123. M.A. Nowak et al., The Arithmetics of Mutual Help, 272 Sci. Am. 50-55 (1995).
124. See Sigmund, supra note 108, at 340 (describing Pavlov strategy as representing "the
simplest rule of learning: to repeat something if and only if it was satisfying the last time").
125. Id
126. Id.
127. RIDLEY, supra note I ll, at 80.
128. See Jonathan Bendor & Pitor Swistak, The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation, 91 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 290, 290 (mathematically demonstrating Axelrod's intuition that efficient strategies
have an evolutionary advantage).
129. Sigmund, supra note 108, at 341.
130. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 100, at 63 (modeling regulatory capture and
demonstrating that capture changes the payoff matrix so that "firm defection will not lead to the
joint defection equilibrium, but to the firm defect:agency [sic] cooperate equilibrium"). This shift
is equally likely in the management/director interactions.
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cooperation is further illustrated by a game with human players, the Ultimatum
Game (and its variations).
C. A Game with Human Players: The Ultimatum Game
Reciprocity only works in small groups where individuals can keep track of
past generosity or defection. While these are the kinds of interactions that
directors and managers have with each other (in the corporate governance game),
their interactions with their investors (in the issuer/investor game) are
impersonal. Yet, people often cooperate with people from whom they cannot
expect reciprocal favors, and obey rules that are essentially unenforceable, such
as pooper-scooper rules for dog owners, and smoking bans in buildings. 3'
Although it would be rational to be a free-rider in a complex society, most people
do not free-ride. The Ultimatum Game and the Group Exchange Game illustrate
this tendency toward cooperation.
Both traits predicted by evolutionary game theory--cooperation and
retaliation--can be demonstrated in the Ultimatum Game. Neither of these traits
is predicted by neoclassical law and economics. Cooperation in the Ultimatum
Game is illustrated through a human tendency toward fairness, in the sense of
sharing gains from trade. This tendency toward fairness appears irrational,
unless one thinks in terms of the selfish gene theory, and the evolutionary
importance of cooperation.3 2 The tendency to retaliate is similarly apparently
"irrational," causing people to incur costs to themselves in order to punish a
defector.'33
In the Ultimatum Game, two players are isolated from each other.3 Player
A is given a sum of money and told to propose a share with player B. Player B
knows the amount at stake, and if player B refuses the offer, neither player gets
anything. If Player B accepts, the money is shared accordingly. No bargaining
13 1. RIDLEY, supra note 111, at 180.
132. See W. D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEORETICAL
BIOLOGY I, 1-52 (1964) (interpreting the selfless behavior of ants in caring for their sisters'
offspring as the behavior motivated by the selfish genes of the ants, because chances of genetic
survival are greater by acting selflessly than by procreating individually). Conversely, even
relationships that have always been assumed to be altruistic, such as the mother's nurture of her
child in utero, have an element of competition. See D. Haig, Genetic Conflicts in Human
Pregnancy, 68 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 495, 495-31 (1993) (describing the hormonal conflicts between
mother and child over blood sugar levels as an example of diverging genetic interests).
133. This paradox of how harmony prevails over selfishness in biological terms is resolved by
understanding that for each self-interested gene that would be only too happy to individually self-
maximize (in the form of cancer, for example, the paradigmatic mutiny of selfish cells), there are
many others that will combine to suppress it. See EGBERT LEIGH, ADAPTATION AND DIVERSITY
(1971) ("it is as if we had to do with a parliament of genes: each acts in its own self-interest, but
if its acts hurt others, they will combine together to suppress it.").
134. For a description of the Ultimatum Game, see Karl Sigmund et al., The Economics ofFair
Play, 286 SCIENTIFIC AM. 83 (2002).
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is permitted. The logical amount for Player A to offer is any amount greater than
zero; if strict rationality were driving the decision, Player B would accept. But
in fact, the most common offer made by Player A is around one-half of the
original sum, demonstrating a strong tendency toward sharing gains. If the offer
is much less than one-half, Player B almost invariably refuses. 3 ' This
demonstrates a willingness not only to punish the selfish offeror, but also to incur
costs in doing so (because neither player receives anything on refusal). 36 The
results of this game are remarkably consistent across cultures.
37
Cooperation, retaliation, and a tendency toward fairness are context
dependent; however, altering the structure of the Ultimatum Game changes these
results. For example, if the right to be Player A is earned (say, by high scoring
in a test of knowledge or winning the right in a contest), Players A tend to be less
generous, and Players B more accepting of low offers.'38 One of the dangers of
an extremely hierarchical "rank and yank" system such as the one at Enron, 139 is
that it may promote self-dealing behavior. Players A also tend to be less
generous if Players B must accept the offer (the Dictator Game). 4 Anonymity
also has an effect. This has implications for the issuer/investor game, because
investors in large publicly held corporations are not known personally to
corporate insiders. If Player A's identity is protected even from the
experimenter, 70% offer nothing. "' If several Players B compete to accept the
offer, Players A may offer a smaller percent.'42 This also has negative
implications for generosity of issuers toward their investors. If the tendency to
fairness is undermined by anonymity and hierarchy while self-dealing behavior
135. See id. (noting that, on average, two-thirds of offers are between 40 to 50%; only one-
quarter are for less than 20% of the pot; more than one-half of responders reject offers of less than
20% of the pot).
136. Acts of punishment appear to violate the conventional economist's notion of rationality
because rational actors are supposed to ignore sunk costs. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551, 1562-63 (1998) (referring to sunk
costs as letting bygones be bygones). An evolutionary explanation of the desire for punishment is
that it disciplines self-maximizers who refuse to cooperate in much the same way as the selfish gene
theory proposes that the body's cells cooperate to attack mutinous cancer cells. See RIDLEY, supra
note I 11, at 180.
137. RIDLEY, supra note I 1, at 141-42. See Dapluna Lewinson-Zamir, The Choice Between
Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80
TEX. L. REv. 219,227 & n.33 (2001) (listing studies showing the "wide divergence of experimental
results from theoretic predictions ... in different countries and cultures").
138. Id. at 140; Sigmund et al., supra note 134, at 84.
139. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Talent Myth, NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002.
140. Surprisingly, in the dictator game, in which Player A proposes a division of the pot, but
Player B has to accept, results show that although Player A offers tend to be less generous division
than in the Ultimatum Game, most Players A offer a significant percentage of the pot, even if
players identities are hidden. KROBOTKIN & ULEN at 1136.
141. RIDLEY, supra note 11, at 140-41.
142. Sigmund et al., supra note 134, at 84.
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is promoted, efficient norms may not prevail. Thus, the structure of the game as
well as the tendency to fairness are important.
D. Structuring Games: The Role of Law
Game theory helps to explain why deregulation is misconceived and how
collusive behavior between corporate managers and directors can emerge even
in the absence of explicit agreement. As Ellikson discovered, social norms may
evolve in the absence of law among small communities of repeat players.'43 But
once the community becomes larger and more anonymous, as in the
issuer/investor game, or rules and sanctions become less clear, evolutionary game
theory emphasizes the importance of initial conditions and argues strongly for a
role of law to promote investor confidence. 44
1. Initial Conditions: The Importance of Structure for the Emergence of
Markets.-Game theory sees the function of law as structuring the interactions
between players who may have diverging interests and asymmetrical
information.'45 It focuses on what the players in a particular game with specified
objectives observe, what they can infer, and what they are likely to do.'46 The
structure of the game determines the players' payoffs, their strategies, and the
possibility and number of Nash equilibria. Single prisoner's dilemmas are quite
different from repeated transactions with the same players. Confronted with
defect as a first move, tit-for-tat and Pavlov keep retaliating. Even firm-but-fair
spends a lot of time retaliating. None of this is likely to be socially optimal.
Evolutionary game theory suggests that one role of law is to alter the players'
incentive structures in order to make socially valuable transactions more likely.
For example, in a loan contract in the absence of legal liability for default, a
transaction is unlikely to take place even though it would be better for society if
it did, because the lender's optimal strategy would be not to lend.'47 Law thus
143. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrIouT LAW 52-64 (1991).
144. See Nowak et al., supra note 95, at 21 (noting that "cooperation is greater in a sedentary
than in a mobile population" because "[diefectors can thrive in an anonymous crowd").
145. Game theory is a way of studying the strategic behavior of interdependent individuals
with divergent economic interests. Eric Talley, Interdisciplinary Gap Filling: Game Theory and
the Law, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1055, 1057 (1997) (noting that although "law plays an integral
role in shaping and regulating the interaction between players who possess possibly divergent
interests and beliefs," its effect depends on "the players' individual and common understanding (or
lack thereof) of the existence, content, and applicability of legal rules") (reviewing BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 6). Asymmetric information games are those in which the players are not completely
informed about each others' payoffs (but do know that they are incompletely informed).
"Incomplete information is the central problem in game theory and the law." BAIRD ET AL., supra
note 6, at 33.
146. For an elegant description of the fundamental concepts of game theory, see Stephen W.
Salant & Theodore S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime Time?, 94 MIcH. L. REV.
1839, 1845 (1996) (book review).
147. Assigning numbers to this idea, if we assume a gain from the loan of $10 to be shared
20031
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
helps to transform a game with suboptimal equilibria into a game with optimal
solutions. Similarly, in impersonal market transactions, investors who believe
that the game is rigged and sanctions unavailing may withhold their money from
the market. An often-cited justification for the mandatory disclosure regime and
the antifraud provisions is that of encouraging investors to participate in the
market.
2. The Role of Sanctions.--One purpose of legal rules is to sanction and
thereby raise or lower the costs for certain behavior. 48 Voluntary acceptance of
rules that promote participants' objectives is undoubtedly preferable to sanctions
as an economic solution to achieving cooperative behavior.'49 It is certainly
cheaper. But game theory explains that stabilizing cooperative interactions
requires would-be defectors to face the threat of sanctions and "that those who
are charged with identifying defectors and carrying out such sanctions be
sufficiently motivated to do so."' 0 In repeated interactions, informal norms of
reciprocity may emerge, but only if participants know each other and expect that
defection will be met with retaliation at the next iteration of the game.' 5 '
Enforcement by third parties---courts, for example-may be necessary in the
absence of a small community of repeat players.
52
3. Solving Information Asymmetries.-Solving information asymmetry
problems is important in game theory as it is in classical economics. The
assumption of common knowledge in game theory is a strong one. If one of the
players is mistaken about the other player's past move, this can lead to an endless
cycle of defection in a population of tit-for-tatters.'53 Legal rules can help clarify
which ambiguous moves count as defection.'54 Bargaining that takes place over
equally, without legal liability for default, if the lender makes no loan, its payoff is 0, and the
borrower's payoff is 0; if the lender loans $100 and the borrower defaults, the lender is out $110,
and the borrower gains $110; if the borrower repays the loan, the lender's maximum payoff is $5,
and the borrower's is $5. This example is from BAIRD ETAL., supra note 6, at 46. In the presence
of liability for default, however, the lender's maximum payoff is $ 5 whether the borrower defaults
or not, which is preferable to the $0 the lender would receive if no transaction took place. Id.
148. Law and economics goals are to "promote the most efficient allocation of
resources-maximizing wealth and minimizing costs." Mark R. Fondacaro, Towardan Ecological
Jurisprudence Rooted in Concepts ofJustice and Empirical Research, 69 U MKC L. REV. 179, 181
(2000).
149. Edward F. McClennon, Pragmatic Rationality and Rule, in EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS
IN DEMOCRACIES 181, 183 (Johann Gotschl ed. 2001) (arguing that a commitment to rules is
instrumentally rational as a way of solving coordination problems).
150. Id. at 209-10 n.55.
151. Id. at200.
152. See id (observing that increased reporting and punishment of defectors yield increased
cooperation if others in the community, who are not necessarily co-players, also retaliate).
153. BAIRD ETAL., supra note 6, at 174.
154. See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer andAcceptance: Game Theory and the
Law of Contract Formation, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 215, 236 (1990) (noting that "modem research on
bargaining has revealed that additional theoretical refinements, concerning information and the
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time, rather than instantaneously, or that takes place in the absence of
information (about the players' situation, the possible outcomes of a strategy,
about whether the other player is a cooperator or a defector), often have more
than one Nash equilibrium.' Because legal rules affect the way information is
transferred between parties and the timing of its transfer and can direct the
parties toward socially desirable solutions, disclosure and liability rules are
important for market players.
a. The problem of nonverifiable information.-Legal rules and third party
enforcement mechanisms cannot solve all the problems of information
asymmetry. Information may be inaccessible to third parties. Where information
is imperfect and mistakes possible (through misreading signals, for example), tit-
for-tat may devolve into constant defection. For example, a legal rule prohibiting
misrepresentation gives a seller, whose Nash equilibrium might otherwise be to
lie about the number of apples in a box, the incentive to disclose the correct
number. The number of apples is verifiable, both by the buyer and by the court;
however, not all information that the parties need is verifiable. The quality of
apples, for example, or their suitability for gift baskets, may not be so easily
determined. Similarly, investment contracts (whether explicit or implicit) need
some mechanism of ensuring that both parties act optimally even though the
court may know less than they do. The possibility of third party mistakes makes
adjudication a strategic choice in this situation." 6 This may be one explanation
for the consternation caused by plaintiffs' strike suits.
b. Reputation and signaling as a solution to information asymmetries.-
Even proponents of deregulation acknowledge the informational asymmetries
between managers (who have access to firm information) and investors (who do
not), on which mandatory disclosure rules are justified. Investor demand for
information coupled with the use of firm quality signaling devices such as
outside auditors, reputable investment bankers, managerial stock purchases and
dividend payment, are supposed to suffice. Because much of the information for
sound investment decisions is unverifiable, however, reputation and signaling
were intended to separate the stars from the dregs.
Signaling is a way that people with nonverifiable information can convey that
information through the way they act." 7 For a while, at least, people believed
that informational quality signaling devices included the use of outside auditors
for corporate financial statements, hiring as underwriters reputable investment
bankers, managerial stock purchases, and stock dividend payments, for example.
In a wider community without interconnecting social and business ties-the
investing public, for example-the problem of nonverifiable information looms
timing of the parties' strategies, need to be imposed on bargaining models if useful results are to
be obtained").
155. See id. at 235, 237 (discussing the effects of timing and information on Nash equilibria).
156. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory ofExpressive Law. 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1699(2000).
157. See BAIRD ETAL., supra note 6, at 123-24 (explaining that the use of warranties may be
a way of signaling high quality goods, a signal that legal rules requiring warranties may impede).
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large. Eric Posner asserts that a wide variety of conduct serves to signal potential
partners about the cooperative intentions of a player."' Posner argues that
merchants investing in expensive office space, correct grooming, social speech,
gift-giving, and similar conduct all signal what he calls the discount rate-the
player's cooperativeness-to future transactional partners.'59 If, indeed, such
conduct is meant to convey one's cooperative nature, however, it is easy to see
how such a wide variety of behaviors could be misinterpreted (or even
strategically adopted to fake other players out). Similarly, the adoption of one
of the formerly Big Five accounting firms did little to ensure the quality of
Enron's or WorldCom's financial statements. Signaling from Enron's outside
auditors provided no information regarding the quality of the firm because its
auditors were themselves conflicted, as the recipients of large amounts of
consulting revenue stemming from advice on setting up the very partnerships that
were hiding the company's losses).
Reputation also failed to prevent defection: Enron was one of the most
widely followed and well-respected companies in the United States. There is
some reason to be skeptical about the efficacy of analyst reports as signaling
devices. Even in large companies that are followed by analysts, buy
recommendations far outweigh sell recommendations, perhaps as a result of
analyst overoptimism). Enron, a large, widely followed company elicited no
cautionary statements in the financial press despite impending financial disaster.
Because Enron executives were selling off their holdings and because Enron
created thousands of special purpose entities, analysts now uniformly agree that
there were numerous danger signals that should have been reported in the
financial press. The Enron debacle and large number of corporate defections
provide reasons to doubt the efficacy of reputation and signaling devices in
impersonal markets.
Reputational concern may check opportunistic behavior, but its importance
will depend on the frequency of similar transactions, the length of the time
horizon, and how profitable the transaction. 6° Enron and the other large publicly
held corporations that have defected in the issuer/investor game had good
reputations. Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom were widely followed
companies. Moreover, when the situation becomes an end game, the returns to
reputation may not be sufficient to prevent opportunistic behavior.'6 ' The threat
of bankruptcy may thus diminish the importance of reputation in the decisional
calculus.
4. Channeling Behavior in Coordination Games.-Law may have yet
another function: coordinating players' moves. Coordination problems are
persistent in social interactions even where people share an interest in an
158. See ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19-24 (2000).
159. Id. at 23.
160. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 139 (discussing the ways in which concern
for reputation may prevent defection, but also noting that its value depends on how often it will
prove useful).
161. See id. at 266 (discussing the end game problem).
[Vol. 37:141
REGULATING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
efficient outcome, and an equally important function of law is that it may serve
as a focal point for individuals to coordinate their actions.'62 The famous stag
hunt game, for instance, attributed to Jean Jacques Rousseau, requires the players
to coordinate their efforts to achieve optimal payoffs. 6 3 The stag hunt game
involves two players and two strategies: hunt hare or hunt stag. It takes two to
hunt stag, and halfa stag is better than a whole hare. Both players would prefer
to hunt stag together, but would prefer to hunt hare alone over the possibility of
hunting stag alone, and neither knows what the other will do. The Nash
equilibria are for both to hunt stag, both to hunt hare; or a random mix of the
two. "'64 This is known as a complete but imperfect information coordination
game. The players know the payoffs and the available strategies, but neither
knows what the other will do. It is in both the players' best interests to hunt stag,
but without communication, they are unlikely to do so.
The issuer/investor game may be seen as a form of stag hunt. Both issuers
and investors will be better off if they pool their resources and "hunt stag"
together. Yet, due to fear of the other's defection, each may instead hunt hare
alone. Law may provide the necessary signal for issuers and investors to pool
their resources. Line item disclosure rules and periodic reporting requirements
coordinate the types of disclosure that will be required and provide some way of
comparing companies through their disclosure. As Richard McAdams explains,
the "law provides a focal point around which individuals can coordinate their
behavior."' 65
Although a Nash equilibrium is a self-enforcing strategy that cannot be
improved upon as long as the other players are following their prescribed
strategies,166 some games, such as the stag hunt game and the hawk-dove game,
162. See McAdams, supra note 156, at 1652 (arguing that even a sanctionless proclamation
may cause people to change their expectations of what others will do, thus influencing behavior).
163. BAIRDETAL., supra note 6, at 36.
164. Id.
165. McAdams, supra note 156, at 165 1. Although McAdams characterizes his game theory
analysis as a form of rational choice theory, he imports a distinctly behavioral economic view of
rationality. See, e.g., id. at 1662 & 1663 n.38 (claiming an empirical basis for his claims and
acknowledging that his account is an expanded form of rational choice in that "individuals are
rationally exploiting features of their environment, even if the perceptions of those features are not
themselves determined solely by rationality."). The concept of focal point in coordination games
is illustrated by a game where a group of people is given the project of meeting in New York City
on a given day without being permitted to communicate the time or place of meeting. See THOMAs
C. SCHELUNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICTS (1963). In an empirical test, most people given this
task met at noon under the clock in Grand Central Station. Id. Although there were an infinite
number of Nash equilibria (every time and location), the Grand Central clock at noon acted as a
focal point. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 6, at 39.
166. See Talley, supra note 145, at 1059 (explaining that the concept of Nash equilibrium is




may have multiple Nash equilibria. 6 7 If there are two or more equilibrium
points, law serves a channeling function, enabling the parties to choose between
them (by enabling them to predict which of these strategies will prevail). 68 A
common example is choosing on which side of the street to drive. Both right and
left are equilibrium points, as is random right and left, but without some
coordinating force, there is no a priori way to determine whether the players will
choose random sides, right or left.' 69
E. Undermining the Role of Law in the Issuer/Investor Game
So much for games. How does this apply to real life? Enron provides a
useful lens, although the past two years have provided a bumper crop of other
illustrative examples.7' These corporate defections have followed a period of
questionable enforcement of legal rules. A misguidedly "hands-off" approach
to regulation, coupled with obstacles to private enforcement, crippled third party
enforcement mechanisms and produced a climate conducive to defection.
Deregulation was the order of the day, built on free-market arguments that "[i]f
disclosure is worthwhile to investors, the firm can profit by providing it. '
1. Globalization and Deregulation.-Deregulation has been gathering
momentum over the past two decades."7  Two key-and interrelated-
developments have spurred deregulation of the capital markets. The first is the
internet, with its potential for instantaneous communication with investors
around the world. The Internet increasingly is being used as a way to reach
167. See id. 1059 & n.6 (describing a simple coordination game of two players with three Nash
equilibria in which neither player has any incentive to change strategy: choosing whether to drive
on the right or left side of the road, where one solution is that both players choose the right side of
the road, the second solution is that both players choose the left; and the third solution is to
randomly choose to drive on the right or left).
168. See McAdams, supra note 156, at 1659 (explaining that law serves "to coordinate
predictions ... to identify the one course of action that their expectations of each other can
converge on" by helping the players to "'mutually recognize' some unique signal that coordinates
their expectations of each other").
169. Id.
170. WorldCom is being investigated for spectacularly overstating its assets. Kurt Eichenwald
& Simon Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Decision Making, N.Y.TIMES, June 27,2002, atAl
(noting overstatements of WorldCom assets by $3.8 billion). Tyco, GE, IBM, Morgan Chase, all
use similar "off-balance-sheet" partnerships to manage their finances. PNC Financial Services
Group is being investigated by the SEC for using off-balance sheet entities to hide underperforming
assets, as is Dynegy. Bush Doctrine, N.Y.TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 12. Managers at Global
Crossing and Lucent, like those at Enron, similarly cashed out while withholding information that
their companies were going down in flames. ImClone's former chief executive officer (CEO) has
been indicted for insider trading. Id.
171. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 682.
172. See Steinberg, supra note 3 1, at 348 (observing "widespread accommodations for both
domestic and foreign issuers").
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investors, inform them about investment opportunities, as well as to effect trades.
Web pages for issuers and securities brokerage firms are proliferating.
Frequently, hyperlinks exist between them. There is no reason to suppose that
their audience will be limited by national boundaries.
At the same time, globalization, with its accompanying increase in
international competition, is forcing a new transnational perspective on many
financial institutions, including the securities industry. Foreign issuers have
dramatically increased their presence in the U.S. markets, through registered
offerings, private placements, and American Depository Receipts. 73 Fifteen
percent of the listed corporations on the New York Stock Exchange are now
foreign issuers, and American investors now plough over $5 trillion into foreign
securities.'74 U.S. issuers have similarly sought out foreign markets.
Reluctant to forgo the diversification benefits to American investors, the SEC
has dramatically liberalized its approach to disclosure requirements for foreign
issuers.'7 5 Furthermore, sensitive to the charge that it is creating a dual regime
of easy access to U.S. markets for foreigners, coupled with much more onerous
disclosure duties for domestic issuers, the SEC has also revisited many of its
disclosure requirements for domestic issuers in an attempt to streamline its
requirements and lessen the burden on regulated entities.'76 As a result, both
foreign and domestic issuers have a much greater choice about the level of
173. American Depository Receipts are ownership interests in a particular number of securities
held by a U.S. bank or trust company. See generally Joseph Velli, American Depository Receipts:
An Overview, 17 FORDHAM lINT'L L.J. 38 (1994).
174. U.S. Statistical Abstract 838 (1999).
175. Foreign issuers offering securities in the United States must register using forms F-1, F-2
and F-3 that parallel the registration forms S-1, S-2, and S-3 required of United States issuers. The
SEC has lightened their disclosure burdens, however, by permitting financial statements to be
prepared according to the accounting principals in their locale, as long as they explain material
variations from U.S. GAAP requirements. See JAMEs D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 327 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the streamlining of disclosure requirements
for foreign issuers in the United States). Foreign issuers are also excused from disclosing line-of-
business information, and have reduced disclosure obligations with respect to management
compensation, and management transactions with the issuer. Id. Regulation S facilitates offshore
offerings.
176. For example, the accommodations for domestic issuers include:
[Tihe adoption of the "accredited purchaser" principle under Regulation D, thereby
dismantling the mandatory disclosure framework in offerings made solely to accredited
purchasers and relegating such investors to private redress under federal law exclusively
to the Section I 0(b) anti-fraud remedy; shortening the holding period to resell restricted
securities to one year and permitting unrestricted resales by nonaffiliates of the subject
issuer after a two-year holding period; [and] authorizing extensive incorporation by
reference in registered offerings by less than premier issuers pursuant to the shelf [sic]
registration rule and SEC Form S-3 ....
Steinberg, supra note 3 1, at 348-49.
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disclosure they will have to provide.'77
In addition to the deregulatory trend of the SEC, Enron illustrates other
issues posed by the absence of government regulation. Its on-line energy trading
systems functioned without any government oversight because over-the-counter
derivatives are not regulated, by either the SEC or the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). 78 In testimony before the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, Professor Frank Portnoy said that Enron employees "used
dummy accounts and rigged valuation methodologies to create false profit and
loss entries for the derivatives Enron traded."' 7 9 'A bill currently before the
Senate would give the CFTC the authority to regulate energy derivatives, rolling
back the commodity law exemption for over-the-counter derivatives. 8 '
However, the CTFC chair, James Newsome, told the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee that he remains committed to a deregulated futures
industry.'' As a result, it remains unlikely that much will be done to regulate
these vehicles.
2. Litigation Barriers.-In theory, defecting corporate managers face
punishment, not only from government enforcement efforts, but also from private
litigants. Private enforcement potentially is available through two major legal
avenues: the federal securities laws and state law fiduciary duty obligations.
The securities laws place disclosure obligations on corporate management in the
form of line item disclosure obligations, reporting obligations, and liability under
the antifraud provisions. State fiduciary duties arise from agency principles and
include the duty of care" 2 and the duty of loyalty. 3 From these basic precepts,
the duty of candor and the duty to disclose arise. 84
The SEC has traditionally refrained from addressing state law corporate
governance standards.'85 Two important concerns are the primacy of federal
177. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (mandatory nature of securities regulation has been eroding for the last
twenty years, due to rethinking the "twin tenets that have animated securities regulation for more
than half a century-namely, manager informational shirking and investor helplessness").
178. Enron Case Highlights Policy Question, How Much to Regulate OTC Derivatives, 34
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (DNA), at S-7 (Mar. 4, 2002) [hereinafter OTC Derivatives].
179. Id. (quoting Frank Portnoy).
180. S. 1951, 107th Cong. § 1(c) (2002).
181. OTC Derivatives, supra note 178, at S-8.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFAGENCY § 379 (1958) (calling for agents to exercise the care
and skill "standard in the locality for the kind of work... [and] any special skill" the agent has).
183. Id. § 387 (requiring that the agent work "solely for the benefit of the principal in all
matters connected with his agency").
184. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1115 (1996) (describing the genesis of the
Delaware duty of candor); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) (requiring that an
agent has the duty to disclose all matters relating to the agency).
185. See, e.g., In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (declining to mandate disclosure
of the directors' dereliction of duty for anything less than "[o]utright fraud or reckless indifference"
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litigation in the securities area and the fear of inconsistent rulings regarding
fiduciary duty-corporate governance-issues. Federal securities law requires
initial, transaction-specific and periodic disclosure, and its antifraud provisions
require that any disclosures made be truthful and not misleading." 6 In contrast,
most state corporate governance law requires disclosure only in the event of
shareholder action.'87 Under both federal and state law, claims are based on
allegations that the corporation made a false or misleading statement. However,
in both areas, litigation is becoming more difficult.
a. Statutory barriers.-The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA)188 raised procedural hurdles aimed at reducing perceived abuses of
federal class action securities suits,189 while the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) 90 preempted the ability ofplaintiffs to take their
securities claims to state court (where the hurdles might be lower). 9' Together,
amounting to "total abdication" of their role). Under PSLRA, two types of state disclosure actions
are preserved: for misrepresentations involving a buy-back or going-private transaction and for
misrepresentations in connection with a tender offer, merger, or exchange offer. This is the so-
called "Delaware Carve-Out." See The Securities Uniform Standards Act of 1997-S 1260:
Hearings on S. 1260 Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on
Securities, 105th Cong. 69, 73 (1998) (noting that "the Delaware courts can resolve these claims
... in a matter of days or weeks") (statement of John F. Olson).
186. See, e.g., Jennifer O'Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship
Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities
Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 479-82 (2002) (discussing the legal framework of the federal
disclosure and anti-fraud provisions).
187. Delaware is an exception, requiring that even if shareholder action is not requested, any
disclosure that is made must be truthful and not misleading. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,
9 (Del. 1998).
188. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737(1995).
189. The PSLRA additionally provides, among other things, for imposition of penalties on the
plaintiff ifthe lawsuit was found to be frivolous, proportional rather than joint and several liability,
a safe-harbor for firms' forward-looking statements, and choosing lead counsel. Id.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2000). See, e.g., Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251
F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that SLUSA applied to a class action alleging misrepresentations
in the sale of annuity contracts, which activated removal); In re Bank Am. Corp. Secs. Litig., 263
F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that Congress was funneling class-action securities litigation
into the federal courts).
191. The purpose of SLUSA was to discourage plaintiffs from circumventing the PSLRA by
filing in state rather than federal court, to encourage disclosure of forward-looking information,
and to establish uniform rules for securities class actions. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 13
(1998). SLUSA preempts state law entirely where it applies, so that not only do plaintiffs lose their
right to bring securities claims in state courts, they also lose their right to litigate state claims in
federal court through supplemental jurisdiction. O'Hare, supra note 186, at 489. SLUSA preempts
state law securities class actions based on "misrepresentations or omissions of material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of covered securities; or . . . that the defendant used or
employed any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of covered
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these statutes attempted to protect businesses from plaintiffs' attorneys and
coercive settlements. 9 Proponents of PSLRA argued that much pre-PSLRA
plaintiffs' securities litigation was frivolous, but that because of high legal
defense fees, even non-meritorious suits were settled.' 93
The courts, however, were already well-equipped to handle this problem.
Federal courts are no strangers to motions to dismiss. Difficult discovery issues
and the handling of sensitive materials are a frequent phenomenon in federal
courts.'94 Judges can and should manage discovery. 9 ' There is little empirical
evidence supporting these statutes: the 1995 Act was part of the general tort
reform movement, in large part instigated by the insurance, hi-tech venture, and
accounting lobbies,' 96 and the 1998 Act was based on the dubious and
controversial claim that litigants were circumventing the intent of Congress by
securities." SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, §101(a)(l)&(b)(I), 112 Stat. 3227. SLUSA preempts
"covered class actions," which it defines as suits "on a representative basis" or on behalf of "more
than 50 persons." ld This is a significant barrier to litigation, because most securities fraud actions
are prohibitively expensive for individual investors, so that they tend to be brought as class actions.
The "Delaware Carve out," however, exempts shareholder derivative actions and claimed breaches
of fiduciary duty, even when they involve securities disclosures. SLUSA § 16(d) (exempting certain
covered class actions). See Arliav. Blankenship, 234 F. Supp. 2d 606, 612-13 (S.D. W. Va. 2002)
(derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty exempted from SLUSA under § 16(d)); Dediger v.
Tallman, 2000 WL 268309 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2000) (referring to § 16(d) as the "Delaware carve-
out"). A shareholders' derivative action is brought on behalf of the corporation for harm to the
corporation. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath ofthe Insurance Crisis,
39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1156-57 (1990) (discussing the difference between direct and derivative
claims).
192. See 141 CONG. REc. S17,933-04, S17,954 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr.
Dodd). The purpose of the PSLRA was to curb perceived abuses in private securities actions. See
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995). PSLRA also provides a statutory safe harbor for
forward looking statements. Securities Act of 1933 § 27A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (2000);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c)(I)(A)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2000). See H.R. REP.
No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) ("Understanding a company's own assessment of its future potential
would be among the most valuable information shareholders and potential investors could have
about a firm.") (remarks of former SEC Chair Richard Breeden).
193. See, e.g., Ahiq Ali & Sanjay Kallapur, Securities Price Consequences of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Related Events, 76AccT. REv. 431-60 (200 1) (noting
arguments that PSLRA was needed to deter nuisance suits).
194. See Joel A. Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REv. 438, 438 (1994)
(arguing that pre-PSLRA courts were well equipped to dismiss nonmeritorious suits).
195. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (observing that the trialjudge
has "broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery").
196. See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis ofthe Effect
of the PSLRA 's Internal-Information Standard on '33 Act and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q.
537, 556 (1998) (explaining the genesis of the PSLRA as part of the general tort reform movement,
in Congress's "Contract with America" ).
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taking their claims to state court. 197
PSLRA requires the plaintiff to "state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."'
Upon the filing of a motion to dismiss, PSLRA provides an automatic stay of
discovery.' 99 As Hillary Sale noted, this combination is "outcome determinative
and, if strictly applied, virtually impossible to meet" in private securities
litigation.°°
Although previous pleading standards (specifically Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure) also required pleading fraud with particularity, pre-
PSLRA plaintiffs were able to obtain needed internal company information
through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's liberal discovery provisions.2"'
In enacting PSLRA, Congress expected to deter strike suits2"2 by requiring
dismissal if plaintiffs fail initially to plead not only the reason or reasons why an
alleged misstatement was misleading when made but also facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter. °3 Without discovery,
however, plaintiffs are unable to obtain documents such as board meeting notes,
internal audit documents, or internal memoranda-the very documents most
plaintiffs need to document their claims. 24 As a result, not only strike suits but
also meritorious fraud claims may be quelled.2"5
197. Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of Delaware
Corporations' Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FiN. 1, 31(2000).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
199. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A(O, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2() (2000); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 21D(6)(3)(B)), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4b(3)(B) (2000).
200. Sale, supra note 196, at 538.
201. Id. (noting the change wrought by PSLRA's pleading and stay rules). Professor Sale
explains that "in order to meet the common-law pleading standards developed by the Ninth and
Second Circuits prior to the [PSLRA], plaintiffs needed access to internal company information"
which they obtained "by engaging in discovery and then repleading their complaints." Id. at 539.
Former-President Clinton expressed a similar concern in his veto message, stating that the bill
would have "the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims."
141 CONG. REC. H15,214, H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of President Clinton).
Then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt similarly warned that the legislation would undercut investors'
rights. Id. at H15,220.
202. A strike suit is defined by one business dictionary as a "derivative action, usu[ally] based
on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or to obtain a settlement." A HANDBOOK OF
BusiNEss LAW TERMS 579 (Bryan A. Garner ed. 1999).
203. 1934 Act § 21D(b)(l)-(2).
204. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Secs. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 767-68 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (finding allegations of insider trading together with dates and contents of negative internal
reports insufficient absent titles, dates, authors, recipients, contents and sources of reports).
205. See Sale, supra note 196, at 564 (contending that "the Reform Act is likely to allow only
the more flagrant and obvious cases of securities fraud to proceed past a motion to dismiss, while
being overinclusive in its elimination of cases where it is more difficult to identify, and therefore
to plead, fraud" which "is likely to result in unredressed fraud").
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The worry impelling passage of PSLRA was that a typical securities fraud
case was filed not because the plaintiff had discovered fraud, but instead because
there had been a sudden drop in stock price. °6 However, only a small fraction
of companies whose stocks plummet experience such filings.0 7 Moreover, the
pre-PSLRA courts were well aware of this factor and used the particularity
requirements to screen cases that were merely responses to a decrease in price. °8
Nor is there any a priori reason to believe that securities fraud allegations are
beyond the courts' competence to parse.209
Moreover, solicitude for the inability of businesses to defend themselves
from such suits appears unfounded. The costs of insurance and litigation defense
were argued as grounds for the bill, but these costs were never substantiated.
206. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335, 339 (1996) (discussing the
arguments of reform advocates, who contended that any drop of 10% of the stock price prompted
fraud claims).
207. See, e.g., Securities Litigation, 1994: Hearings on H.R. 417 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 118, 119 (1994)
(testimony of Donald C. Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt
Univ. School of Law) (arguing for reform, but suggesting that there was no meaningful correlation
between stock-price drops and fraud claim filings); 103d Cong. 267 (1994) (testimony of Leonard
B. Simon, attorney); 141 CONG. REC. S 17,933-04, S17,951 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of
Mr. Bryan) (citing University of California study demonstrating that of 589 stocks that dropped
20% in price within a five-day period, only 3% were sued). Even the bill's proponent, Senator
Domenici, could say no more than that 21% of securities fraud cases were filed within forty-eight
hours of a drop in price. 141 CONG. REC. S17,965-03, S17,968 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement
of Mr. Domenici) (citing study by National Association of Securities and Commercial Law
Attorneys that found that 21% of fraud cases were filed within forty-eight hours of a price drop).
208. See Sale, supra note 196, at 544 (discussing courts' response to the fear that
nonmeritorious suits were being filed simply because the stock price dropped, in particular the
requirement that plaintiffs plead facts to show that the difference was attributable to fraud).
209. This is not a suggestion that courts are unconcerned about the difficulties presented.
Courts certainly have expressed concern about adjudicating competing interests in the absence of
statutory or regulatory guidance. See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d
Cir. 1993) (noting the "inevitable tension between two powerful interests" and complaining that
"the adjudication process is not well suited to the formulation of a universal resolution of the
tensions" in the absence of statutory or regulatory guidance); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d
624,627(7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that"only a fraction offinancial deteriorations reflect fraud").
Notably, however, courts frequently express dismay at resolving complex issues in a wide variety
of settings. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science
in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55 (1998) (discussing the courts' rhetoric of dismay at
having to decide the admissibility of expert testimony and opining that courts are quite capable of
making such determinations).
210. For example, in the "Joint Explanatory Statement" the managers of the House and Senate,
in support of their recommendation, proffered only the statement of "the general counsel of an
investment bank" regarding high discovery costs. See Conference Report on H.R. 1058, with Joint
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The argument that businesses were being held up for ransom and forced to settle
meritless litigation was wholly unsupported by empirical data. Subsequently,
empirical studies have shown that most pre-PSLRA cases settled and that
settlements were tied to the merits."' In addition, pre-PSLRA cases routinely
settled for well under 20% of the potential investor losses." 2
Although the number of securities fraud cases has not fallen post-PSLRA, 2"
this may be due to an increase in meritorious securities fraud cases that can
obtain the necessary factual basis without discovery. It says nothing about the
effect of PSLRA on meritorious cases that cannot obtain such information
without discovery." 4 A number of changes have occurred in the kinds of cases
filed post-PSLRA. As the empirical study of Mukesh Bajaj and his co-workers
demonstrated, the number of accounting fraud (including revenue restatements),
improper accounting practices and improper revenue recognition cases filed
increased, while the percentage of material omissions cases decreased
somewhat.25 Perhaps these cases are less difficult to substantiate pre-discovery.
One interesting and unanticipated result is that the settlement rate decreased post-
PSLRA from 57.6% within four years of filing to 26% within four years of
filing. 16 Thus, it would appear that survival of the PSLRA dismissal process has
made litigants more willing to bring their cases to trial. However, it is difficult
to draw firm conclusions from these data because of the considerable variation
in the data over time.21' Another unanticipated consequence of impeding
meritorious lawsuits is that it may reduce incentives for honest disclosure.1 8
Statement of Conference Comm., H.R. REP. No. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 27
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1893 (Dec. I, 1995).
211. See Stephen P. Marino & Renee D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities
Class Action Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEc. RFG. L.J.
1159 (1994) (demonstrating that settlements are tied to the merits of the case).
212. See Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Analysis,
working paper, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/research/studies/20001116_SSRN_
Bajaj.pdf, at 12 (Nov. 16, 2000) (noting that the mean settlement ration to potential investor loss
amounts varied from 7.1% for cases filed in the Fourth Circuit to 21.9% for cases filed in the Tenth
Circuit).
213. See id. at 3 (noting that the number of federal cases filed had "reached an all-time high
of 248 filings" in 1998).
214. See Perino, supra note 4, at *22 (acknowledging that it is impossible to know whether
meritorious suits are being chilled and observing that "while it is difficult to assess the claim that
there is more fraud now than there was prior to the PSLRA, the other explanations for the apparent
increase in filings appear to be inadequate"); Ribstein, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that "reduced
liability risk may have encouraged fraudulent or shirking behavior in marginal situations where
defrauding insiders or lax auditors had persuaded themselves that the likelihood of detection was
low... [which] argues for reversing some aspects of the PSLRA").
215. Bajaj et al., supra note 212, at 4.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Id. at 13.
218. See Seligman, supra note 194 (arguing that corporate officers and advisors will have
2003]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
This is substantiated by some evidence that shareholders consider PSLRA
harmful.219
b. Judicial barriers.-PSLRA and SLUSA are not the only new barriers to
securities actions. In addition to statutory changes in the legal landscape, the
Supreme Court, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,220
held that private fraud actions under the Securities Exchange Act section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 1 Ob-5 cannot be brought under an aiding and abetting theory.22 '
Instead, they must be based on primary liability-the statements must be
attributable to the defendant.222 The statements in reports filed with the SEC are
signed by the directors; hence, their liability for material misstatements or
omissions is not changed by the Central Bank decision. Nor is primary liability
for secondary actors such as accountants and lawyers changed. They are still
responsible for statements that are attributable to them.223
What the Court did change, however, was the importance of being able to
pursue claims against the primary actors-the very thing that PSLRA
subsequently limited. Prior to Central Bank, courts had widely accepted the
viability of secondary liability. 24 The courts have extended the rationale of
Central Bank to conspiracy liability as well as aiding and abetting.2 5 Although
Central Bank makes it clear that the statements attributable to a firm outsider,
like an accountant or a lawyer, may still be the source of primary liability, it is
fewer incentives to disclose if it becomes more difficult to bring meritorious actions).
219. See Ali & Kallapur, supra note 193 (studying stock price changes as a result in
announcements relating to PSLRA and concluding that the evidence demonstrates shareholder
concern that PSLRA may have harmful effects). Ali and Kallapur examined the results of prior
studies that had concluded that stockholders considered PSLRA beneficial, and found that "the
timing of multiple confounding events makes the interpretation of these daily returns ambiguous
... [and] additional analyses... are largely inconsistent with their interpretation." Id.
220. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
221. Id. at 191.
222. Id.
223. The Court did not delineate the kinds of activities that would result in primary liability
for secondary defendants. See id. at 177. Instead, it merely observed that in some circumstances,
accountants, lawyers and banks, could be primarily liable for material misstatements on which
investors rely:
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator ... assuming
all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lob-5 are met.
Id.
224. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability
Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 CoLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1999) (observing that
Central Bank "came with little warning----courts and commentators had widely accepted the validity
of aiding and abetting liability").
225. See, e.g., Dinsmore v. Squadron, 135 F.3d 837, 838 (2d Cir. 1998); In re GlenFed, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995).
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less clear where primary liability ends and secondary liability begins.226 This
means, at least in the Second and Eleventh Circuits, that a secondary actor cannot
be held liable for clients' disclosure statements, even if they participated in
crafting those statements.227
These impediments have the unfortunate resultof chilling deterrence of many
of the abuses that Enron illustrates.22 As it stands now, there is a void in the
protection of defrauded shareholders and the integrity of the mandated disclosure
system, especially where those primarily liable are insolvent.229 Outside
professionals are expected to serve gatekeeper roles in the disclosure system.2 a0
The question asked after the savings and loan debacle: "Where were the lawyers
and accountants?" is equally apt in the Enron and WorldCom. Without the threat
of secondary liability, the answer is far more likely to be "asleep at the wheel."
Sarbanes-Oxley did little to remedy the problem. The SEC adopted a reporting
rule for attorneys in response to Sarbanes-Oxley, under which lawyers must
report wrongdoing up the corporate ladder and if no corporate response is
forthcoming, withdraw.3
Securities law is notthe only source of mandatory disclosure regulation; state
law corporate governance statutes also require disclosure of some information
that a firm's managers might otherwise prefer to keep to themselves.232 Most
226. See Fisch, supra note 224, at 1300 (noting that liability for one's own representations is
primary rather than secondary liability).
227. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11 th Cir. 2001) (neither
law firm nor accounting firm could be liable for statements unless they are "publicly attributable"
to them at the time of the investment decision); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175
(2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999) (outside auditor can incur liability only for those
statements attributable to it). In the Third Circuit, on the other hand, a lawyer who significantly
participates in drafting documents may become primarily liable as an author of those documents.
See Klein v. Boyd, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 90,136,90,137 (3d Cir.
Feb. 12, 1998), vacated on grant ofreh 'g, No. 97-1143, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 412 1, at * I (Mar.
9, 1998) (securities lawyer's participation in drafting client disclosure documents may result in
primary liability even without attribution).
228. Cf Steinberg, supra note 31, at 350 (noting that the "federal courts, most particularly the
Supreme Court, have also been influential during the past twenty-five years in restricting investor
access to redress"). Although Professor Steinberg suggests that this may have had the "concomitant
effect of encouraging capital formation," he provides no evidence of such encouragement, and he
is unequivocal that "[i]nvestor protection has been diminished." Id. at 350-51.
229. Seligman, supra note 194, at 456.
230. See Fisch, supra note 224, at 1314 (explaining that "the securities disclosure system is
premised upon the supposition that outside professionals will be involved in the disclosure process
•.. as a substitute for greater supervision by government regulators").
231. See News Release, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2003
WL164827 (SEC Jan. 23, 2003).
232. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 114 (1999) (noting the dual regime). Full disclosure is a pre-requisite for
shareholder ratification of director actions. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
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states require full disclosure in connection with shareholder action. There are
very few occasions for such action, however: shareholders vote for directors,
major corporate changes, and occasionally to ratify otherwise questionable
director actions. Delaware is one of the few states that has explicitly imposed a
duty of candor on directors requiring truthful disclosure to shareholders even in
the absence of requested shareholder action.2" In Malone v. Brincat,3
shareholders alleged that the directors of Mercury Finance Company, a Delaware
corporation, knowingly disseminated false financial information in required
periodic disclosures over a period of four years, aided and abetted by the firm's
auditors, at the end of which period the firm lost virtually all its value.235
Reluctant to usurp the federal authority over the securities markets, the Chancery
Court dismissed, finding that there was no request for shareholder action.236
Although it affirmed the dismissal, the Delaware Supreme Court permitted the
plaintiffs to refile, holding that deliberately misinforming shareholders violates
directors' fiduciary duties, even in the absence of a request for shareholder
action.237 Thus, under Delaware state law, a false statement knowingly made will
subject a director to liability, whether or not the statement was made in
connection with a request for shareholder action . 8 This may deter conscious
wrongdoing (and subsequent lying to cover it up).
The real problem, however, is oversight. Although the firm is to be managed
"by or under the direction of" the board of directors,2 39 the courts have been
reluctant to impose monitoring duties on the board.24° If directors make
1985) (requiring full disclosure for shareholder ratification of director actions).
233. See, e.g., Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (declining to
impose duty of candor in absence of request for shareholder action).
234. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
235. Id. at 8.
236. Id. (holding that if the release of inaccurate information into the marketplace was
unconnected with a Delaware corporate governance issue, the claim was only viable under federal
law).
237. Id. at 10.
238. Id. But see Hamermesh, supra note 184, at 1173-74 (contending that directors should
not be liable under state fiduciary duty law for statements that do not elicit shareholder approval).
239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 14 1(a) (1991) (providing for that deviate from these norms);
N.Y. Bus. Corp. L. § 701 (McKinney 1986) (accord); REVISED MODELBUS. CORP. ACT §8.01 (3d
ed. 1994) (accord).
240. See JAMEs D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 195 (1997) (noting that "requirements that the
directors be attentive and reasonably informed are procedural in nature; the substantive requirement
is that their decision have a 'rational basis'... [b]ut public policy considerations... have caused
the courts not to apply these standards rigorously"). The few cases that do impose oversight duties
do so in the context of banking, financial and insurance firms, which arguably have a higher
fiduciary obligation. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). But see
Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that directors of grain cooperative
breached their duty of care in failing to adequately hedge in grain market or supervise
management); Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 685 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding
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egregiously bad decisions because they were asleep at the wheel,24 to what
extent are they entitled to judicial deference? In the Enron situation, for
example, there appear to have been egregious monitoring failures by the board. 42
To keep judges from second-guessing director decisions that turn out, in
hindsight, to be bad decisions, the businessjudgment rule protects directors from
liability for foolish decisions." 3 Although Smith v. Van Gorkom244 imposed a
process requirement that directors obtain expert advice and inform themselves
about management proposals, it did little to ensure that directors do anything
other than go through the motions of informing themselves.24 Even if the Enron
directors had demanded the deal sheets that were supposed to inform them of
intra-firm conflicts, there is no assurance that they would have reached a
different disclosure decision or done anything to prevent the conflicts (since even
when apprised of conflicted transactions they waived their own rules).
Moreover, although Caremark 46 (at least, in dicta) appears to enforce a duty to
ensure that information flows to the directors, it does not mandate that the
directors either establish a compliance program (although they must examine and
discuss the issue) or that they act upon the information that they receive. 47 The
Enron directors had a sophisticated compliance program; they simply either
ignored its requirements or ignored the information that they had obtained. 48
Moreover, a director's duty to disclose has been significantly curtailed by a
that officer-directors of security agency breached their fiduciary duty by neglecting the business).
24 1. Cf Boards of Directors: Primary Responsibilityfor Recent Corporate Scandals Rests
with the Board of Directors According to Panel Members at ABA Meeting, 17 CORP. COuNS.
WKLY. 258 (Aug. 21, 2002) (reporting the remarks of Neil Minow that the boards were "at the
center of the perfect storm").
242. See Ribstein, supra note 2, at 3-7 (discussing oversight failures and noting that Enron's
Special Committee acknowledged the board's monitoring failures).
243. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (directors have no liability except for actions taken
in bad faith, without reasonable belief, without adequate information, or unless they failed to
exercise oversight for an extended period); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 296.
244. 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985) (holding directors had failed to disclose the "fact that the
Board had no reasonably adequate information indicative of the intrinsic value of the Company").
245. But see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 281 (arguing that Van Gorkom "created a set of
incentives consistent with the teaching of literature on group decisionmaking" by encouraging
"inquiry, deliberation, care, and process"). The major consequence of Van Gorkom, however,
appears to have been a "full employment act" for investment bankers and other experts rather than
a genuine search for critique.
246. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (outlining an
obligation of directors to set up a law compliance program to meet their monitoring duties).
247. Rather, the Chancery Court held that because the Caremark directors had taken active
steps by adopting an ethical code, organizing a confidential reporting system, appointing a
compliance officer and training employees, that was enough to preclude liability. Id. at 970.
248. See Enron Report, supra note 58, at 14 (explaining that "fh]igh risk accounting practices,
extensive undisclosed off-the-books transactions, inappropriate conflict of interest transactions, and
excessive compensation plans were known to and authorized by the board").
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triad of available protections: exculpation, indemnification, and insurance.249
Starting in the late 1980s, corporate codes began to permit charter provisions
exculpating directors for negligent conduct.25 Most public corporations have
amended their charters to include these provisions.2"' In order to overcome
exculpatory provisions, plaintiffs had to show the directors' bad faith in making
the disclosure decision.5 Moreover, the duty to disclose does not extend to
corporations, so that if an exculpatory provision applies, shareholders cannot
simply sue the corporation in lieu of the directors.253
As a result of the statutory and judicial litigation barriers outlined above, in
the kinds of financial nondisclosures that appear to be at the root of many of the
recent corporate defections, shareholders (who might wish to bring their claims
against directors under the federal securities laws, for recklessly making a
misleading statement in the Audit Committee Report,254 for example) would have
a difficult time meeting the PSLRA pleading standards. They would not be able
to establish a state law fiduciary duty claim either because, to be liable, a director
must knowingly misrepresent engaging in the described activities.255
249. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 232 (discussing the triad of protections for
directors).
250. See Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in Corporate Law: Perfecting the
Exoneration of Directors, Corrupting Indemnification andStraining the Framework of Corporate
Law, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 443, 467 (discussing the development of corporate codes
permitting director indemnification).
251. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 300 (discussing the evolution of state exculpatory
statutes and their adoption by corporations). In addition to exculpatory provisions, "all states have
statutory provisions authorizing director indemnification to some degree." Id. at 301. Thus,
expenses for legal defense, and the advancement ofthose expenses, are widely available. Id. at 304.
252. See Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (Del. 1996) ("The record reveals that any
misstatements or omissions that occurred were made in good faith."); see also Arnold v. Soc'y for
Say. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) (concluding that although the proxy statements at
issue contained an omission of material fact, the directors were immune from liability due to the
corporation's exculpatory charter provision).
253. See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 534 (Del. 1996)
(explaining that shareholders seeking to hold the corporation liable for proxy statements containing
materially misleading misstatements were precluded from suit because the federal proxy rules
provided a remedy).
254. Item 306 of Regulation S-K and S-B and Item 7(d)(3) of Schedule 14A require firms
listed on a national exchange to provide an Audit Report in the company's proxy statement
disclosing whether the audit committee reviewed audited financial statements, discussed them with
management, discussed matters with the independent auditor, and recommended that they be
included in the annual report. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.306(a), 240.14a-101 (2001).
255. See, e.g., Gregory S. Rowland, Note, Earnings Management, the SEC, and Corporate
Governance: Director LiabilityArisingfrom the Audit Committee Report, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 168,
168, 196-97 (2002) (observing that the "directors would merely need to read the financial
statements... engage in certain discussions regarding those statements... and obtain from (and
discuss with) the outside auditor a statement ofthat outside auditor's independence" and concluding
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Ill. BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
An intriguing question is why, given that directors know that their investors
need fundamental financial information, given that regulations make at least a
minimum ofdisclosure about corporate finances mandatory, and given the market
forces urging corporate signaling of trustworthiness to investors, corporate cover-
ups occur. If investors want their firms to engage in some risky behavior in order
to achieve profits, why cover it up? If the fear is that investors will walk away,
why do it? Cover-ups may arise from incentives to act self-interestedly: there
may simply be some directors who are "bad apples," strategically defecting and
who-as game theory illustrates-need to be punished to reestablish cooperation
in the investor/issuer game. Alternatively, directors who abdicate their duties to
investors may have such strong incentives to act cooperatively with management
that they are willing to forego their monitoring duties. On the other hand,
directors may have convinced themselves that they were acting cooperatively
(consciously acting in what they believed at the time to be in the best interests of
the firm and its stakeholders), but were mistaken about their own strategic payoff
or about the other players' strategies or payoffs.
In the Enron example, the directors at Enron could have made a real
difference by refusing to approve financial statements and other disclosures,
refusing to approve transactions that had no economic substance, refusing to
waive provisions of their corporate code (such as the conflict of interest
provisions) and ultimately, by firing officers. In their defense, the directors
claimed that they had been misinformed by management.256 Nonetheless, the
Senate Subcommittee concluded that "overall the Board received substantial
information about Enron's plans and activities and explicitly authorized or
allowed many of the questionable Enron strategies, policies and transactions now
subject to criticism."2 7 No one has accused the Enron directors of directly lining
their own pockets. It is still possible that the Enron board members were "bad
apples," run amok with self-interest. For example, board members may have had
a conflict of interest with respect to approving questionable accounting practices
and disclosure failures because they were paid partly in stock options. Enron
board members were compensated at about $350,000 per year (nearly twice the
national average), in cash, restricted stock, phantom stock units (deferred cash
that "[t]oo many corporate managers, auditors, and analysts are participants in a game of nods and
winks").
256. Throughout the Senate hearings, the directors who were interviewed maintained that
management withheld key information from them. See Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Report, The Role of The Board ofDirectors in Enron's Collapse, SR 107-70, 107th
Cong., 2d Sess., July 8, 2002 at 45.
257. Id. at 13, 14 ("High-risk accounting practices, extensive undisclosed off-the-books
transactions, inappropriate conflict of interest transactions, and excessive compensation plans were
known to and authorized by the Board.").
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payments linked to the price of stock) and stock options.25 The incentives to
cooperate with management may have swamped the directors' incentives to
monitor. They may have been reluctant for reputational or strategic reasons to
do anything that would jeopardize their relationship with management.
In an earlier article, I argued that, given the information that they had, the
directors may have convinced themselves that they were acting in the best
interests of the corporation.259 There, I argued that bounded rationality, the
theory that human thinking evolved through repeated interactions with the
environment, had consequences not only for what happened at Enron, but also
for the success of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's solution.26° Heuristics and group
interactions may affect corporate actions in predictably adverse ways.2 6' I argued
that understanding the operation of these heuristics in the organizational context
and the conditions that make them more likely to occur may also illuminate ways
to counter these tendencies.262
This Article extends the argument that these adaptive mechanisms, aiding
quick and satisficing decisionmaking, may have effects on three aspects of the
corporate climate that foster defections such as those at Enron. First, the
overconfidence bias delineated by cognitive psychology as being especially
prevalent in sales and marketing environments (and Enron at the time of its
demise was primarily a derivatives trading entity) may have created a tendency
to overrate the company's overall prospects, contributions and talents, making
258. Enron Report, supra note 58, at II. Stock options are a worrisome source of pay because
they enable the board member to benefit from stock gains without any risk of loss. See id. at 56.
259. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An Examination
of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 391 (arguing that
"[g]roup dynamics under conditions of relative loss coupled with systemic cognitive biases that
affect decisionmaking and behavior in a context of uncertainty help explain what happened at
Enron, and also suggest the fallacy of the legislative solution").
260. See generally Simon; see David Liabson & Richard Zeckhauser, Amos Tversky and the
Ascent of Behavioral Economics, 16 J. RISK& UNCERTAINTY 7 (1998) (surveying the literature on
behavioral economics).
261. A broad spectrum of people under documented conditions, in particular contexts, make
decisions that appear anomalous from a utility maximizing standpoint and may violate their own
expressed preferences for decision making. See Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making
and Judgment, in I HANDBOOK OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 498 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds., 4th ed. 1998)
(noting that these anomalies in rationality are systemic rather than ad hoc and are highly replicable
in experimental settings). Far from being a pessimistic assessment of human rationality, however,
these studies indicate contexts in which decision makers may need a structured process to make
optimal decisions. See, e.g., id at 500 (reporting studies showing that when anomalies in reasoning
are "made transparent" to decisionmakers, their judgment improves); Bazerman at 8-10 (asserting
that individual and group decision making can be improved by improved awareness of error-prone
heuristics and by providing explicit strategies to counter them).
262. See Gerd Gigerenzer, From Tools to Theories: A Heuristic of Discovery in Cognitive
Psychology, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 254, 267 (1991) (frequency of anomalous reasoning can be
decreased by making the probabilistic nature and questions explicit).
[Vol. 37:141
REGULATING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
it willing to engage in novel ventures (such as the formation of the special
purpose entities that ultimately destroyed the company) and left it with an
inflated notion of its ability to control the risks its actions were creating.263
Second, once embarked on the risky ventures, cognitive conservatism and the
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance created a commitment bias that entrenched
organizational commitment to the solution of special purpose entities and
precluded remedial action.264 Third, a strong bias in human decisionmaking to
simplify (hence the need for heuristics and biases in the first place) is especially
true of group decisionmaking, and when presented with complex financial
transactions, directors have a tendency to think they are simpler and less
controversial than warranted.265 Although these cognitive quirks once may have
provided an evolutionary advantage, they now impede wise corporate judgment,
and any regulation ought to attempt to counteract these tendencies.
Congress's solution to the corporate debacles illustrated by Enron was the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's principal remedy
for director abdication of monitoring duties was to place the audit committee in
charge of monitoring the financial controls of the corporation.2" Because the
legislation does not account for the way people interact in reaching their
decisions, it is unlikely to prevent future incidents like Enron. Cognitive
psychology and evolutionary game theory help explain why.
A. Corporate Compliance Programs: The Congressional Solution
and Its Problems
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the board's audit committee must oversee
corporate financial disclosures.267 Although not all reporting companies are
required to have an audit committee, if a firm wishes to be listed on a national
exchange, it must have one.26 The firm must also disclose whether the audit
committee has a financial expert, and if not, explain why.269 Under the new
legislation, the audit committee not only has sole authority to appoint,
compensate and oversee the firm's auditors, it must also oversee the firm's
263. Beecher-Monas, supra note 259, at 381-86.
264. Id. at 386-87.
265. Id. at 376.
266. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (establishing the audit committee requirement for publicly
listed companies); § 302 (requiring the signing officers to disclose deficiencies in internal controls
to the audit committee).
267. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301, 302.
268. Section 301(1)(A) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC to "direct the national
securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an
issuer that is not in compliance" with the audit committee requirements.
269. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 745, 790 (2002). To
qualify as a financial expert "the Commission shall consider whether a person has, through
education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer,
comptroller, or principal accounting officer of an issuer" sufficient experience. § 407(b).
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compliance program.171 Moreover, section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requires only that the principal executive and financial officers certify that they
have disclosed deficiencies to the issuer's audit committee or persons fulfilling
the equivalent function. Although the initial responsibility for setting up the
program (and certifying that they have done so) rests on the corporation's CEO
and CFO, they must report all "significant deficiencies" to the audit committee.27'
This effectively makes the audit committee the bearer of ultimate responsibility.
The idea of audit committee monitoring as a solution to financial reporting
failures did not originate with Sarbanes-Oxley. The New York Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ both required listed firms to have audit committees composed
mostly or exclusively of independent directors since at least 1999.272 Proxy
statement disclosure about the audit committee's independence and discussions
between the audit committee and management about audited financial statements
have also been required since 1999.273 However, neither the listing requirements
nor the proxy statement disclosure rules were based on any empirical studies
about audit committee effectiveness. Indeed, a number of studies found that the
presence of an audit committee does not affect the likelihood of accounting
fraud. 2 74
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the audit be composed of independent
directors. 75 Independence is defined as meaning that the director may not accept
consulting, advisory, or other fees or be an affiliated person of the issuer or its
subsidiaries. 76 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act defines independence to more closely
comport with an absence of conflict. The definition, therefore, may be a helpful
clarification. However, the use of independent directors as a solution to the
monitoring problem is no more empirically based than the audit committee
solution. Most large firms already have a majority of independent directors, and
270. The audit committee must establish procedures for "the receipt, retention, and treatment
of complaints received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(4)(A). In addition, the audit committee must resolve any
disagreements between the auditor and management. § 301(2). Finally, because the CEO and CFO
must report to the audit committee any deficiencies, fraud, or significant changes in the internal
control system, under section 302, the audit committee appears to bear the ultimate responsibility
for its oversight.
271. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302 (requiring certification of the adequacy of the program).
272. See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303.01(B)(2)(a); 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.306(a),
240.14a- 101 (200 1) (requiring listed firms to provide shareholders with an annual Audit Committee
Report).
273. See SEC Release No. 34-42266 (Dec. 22, 1999).
274. Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REv. 443 (Oct. 1996).
275. Not only must listed companies have an audit committee, but the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requires that if there is an audit committee, its members must be independent directors. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §301(3)(a), 116 Stat. 745, 775-77 (2002).
276. Id. § 301(3)(B)(1),(] I).
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audit committees were already expected to be independent." Indeed, Enron
appears to have had a model board since only two of its fourteen members were
insiders.27
Like the audit committee solution to monitoring problems, the virtues of
independent boards are debatable. Although the Business Roundtable
recommended that a substantial majority of the directors be independent,279 as did
the National Association of Corporate Directors,2 " at least one study finds that
the presence of inside directors on the board significantly increases the
probability of accounting fraud,28' even where the majority is composed of
outside directors, insider presence on most boards remains a strong influence.2"2
In addition, a number of studies show that firms with a majority of independent
directors do not perform any better than firms without such boards, and that firms
with only one or two inside directors may actually perform worse." 3
Most of the audit committee's information will still come-directly or
indirectly-through the CEO and CFO. Because the independent board
members-if not the audit committee-will normally set the CEO's pay, and the
CEO therefore has an incentive to paint a positive picture, there is reason to
believe that the information reaching the audit committee may be skewed. 284 The
audited financial reports ought to provide a check on this kind of misinformation,
277. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 921 (1999) (citing a survey of 484 of the
S&P 500 firms finding that over half had only one or two inside directors, the median firm and over
80% outside directors, and only nine firms had a majority of inside directors).
278. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002)
(noting that the Enron board was "a splendid board on paper, fourteen members, only two insiders
.... [Tihe outsiders had relevant business experience ... [and] owned stock ... [but] was
ineffectual in the most fundamental way").
279. THE Bus. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 10 (1997).
280. Alan L. Dye, Securities Law Compliance Programs, ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 18-
20, 2002.
281. Beasley, supra note 274, at 456-57 (using regression analysis of seventy-five fraud and
seventy-five no-fraud firms to determine that no-fraud firms have a significantly higher proportion
of "gray" and outside directors).
282. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 277, at 923 (noting that firms with majority inside
directors perform equivalently to those with majority outside directors).
283. See id; James P. Walsh & James K Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and External
Corporate Control Mechanisms, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 421, 434 (1990) (citing studies showing
that "there does not yet seem to be consensus support (either theoretically or empirically) for the
conventional wisdom that either an increased presence of outsiders on the board of directors or the
increased ownership stakes of any shareholder group (including management) necessarily improve
corporate performance").
284. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 812 (2001)
(noting the "strong last-period temptation to manipulate the information given to the board").
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but there are reasons to doubt their complete objectivity. 8
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's explicit focus on the audit committee as the
ultimate firm overseer is new, however. This solution is troubling. Little
evidence exists that compliance programs prevent misconduct. The deterrence
model of regulation, based on the theory that legal compliance will occur
whenever the pleasure and profits of breaking the law are outweighed by the pain
of punishment, is problematic when applied to corporate behavior. 86 This is
partly because of the diffusion of responsibility in corporations, and partly
because laws regulating corporate conduct are not capable of defining the precise
behavior required of corporate actors.2"7 As a result, cooperative enforcement
techniques, such as the federal sentencing guidelines'28 (which permit the
existence of an effective compliance program to reduce the severity of
sentencing), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirement of internal controls
monitored by the audit committee, have become a favored method of
enforcement. The idea is that the corporation is in the best position to institute
preventive and detection measures.289 The goal is to provide incentives for
optimal corporate behavior. An anticipated benefit is the reduction of public
monitoring costs.
The idea underlying such regulation is a model of business regulation that
285. MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 2 (3d ed. 1994)
(discussing the Phar-Mor audit to explain why auditors have a pervasive and intractable conflict).
286. See Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 674-76 (discussing the
economic theory of deterrence); John T. Scholz, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 253, 258 (1997)
(stating that the "simple deterrence model is most appropriate when legal statutes unambiguously
define corporate misbehavior" but noting that "rules are seldom capable of defining the exact
behavior desired of corporations").
287. Scholz, supra note 100, at 258 (observing that while "the simple deterrence model is most
appropriate when the legal statutes unambiguously define corporate misbehavior" such rules are
rare).
288. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(f) (reducing base fines in the presence
of an effective compliance program).
289. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687,693 (1997) (noting that "entity liability can
lead companies to institute 'preventive measures' that deter by making misconduct more difficult
or expensive for wrongdoers, or by reducing the illicit benefits of unpunished (or successful)
misconduct, without affecting the probability that it is detected by enforcement officials"). In
discussing the financial disclosure regime, the agents at issue are the managers, such as those at
Enron who advocated the use of special purpose entities to keep debt off the books, the directors
who waived conflict of interest proscriptions in the Enron compliance code, and both managers and
directors who failed to disclose these shenanigans. The problem with entity liability for
nondisclosure, however, is that it effectively permits the shareholders to be hit twice: once by the
managers and directors who failed to disclose, and once by the imposition of liability on the
corporation, a liability they must ultimately pay. Moreover, in an Enron-type situation, where the
corporation itself is bankrupt, no entity remains for liability.
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Ayres and Braithwaite call an "enforcement pyramid" strategy.29 In this
strategy, regulators predominantly rely on self-regulation (the base of the
pyramid) but may become increasingly punitive in the face of noncompliance,
with the ultimate threat of a "big gun" at the top of the pyramid for those firms
that persist in noncompliance.29 This model is based on the tit-for-tat strategy
of evolutionary game theory.292 It increasingly characterizes enforcement
practice."'
Even if there were evidence that compliance programs were effective in
deterring misconduct, there remains the question of why the audit committee
should be singled out as the responsible actor. If the justification is that these
independent financial experts are the only ones in the firm that can understand
the complex corporate financing decisions faced by today's firms, that
justification has little merit. Financial complexity impairs the ability of
everyone, including management, to determine value. 94 Complexity should alert
directors to a problem. If the directors do not understand what is going on,
neither the investors (or analysts) are unlikely to have any deeper insight, and
disclosure is not going to perform its function of revealing the value of the firm.
Corporate compliance programs ("internal controls") are supposed to solve
the problem of ensuring that those at the top of the bureaucracy are informed
regarding what is going on "down in the trenches." Like the audit committee and
independent director solutions, the internal controls solution has been around for
290. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 100, at 39 (describing the enforcement pyramid).
291. Id. at 48-49 (stating that "regulators should not do without an image of invincibility in
the background, and should be reluctant to push punishment to the foreground of day-to-day
regulatory encounters").
292. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment versus Cooperation in
Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 727 (1997) (explaining
how a tit-for-tat strategy combined with a range of sanctions, as with an enforcement pyramid, "can
increase the potential of this strategy").
293. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1312 (2001) (explaining that the model of an enforcement
pyramid is "now widely accepted in regulatory debate and increasingly characterize[s] enforcement
practice").
294. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons From Enron,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 1802 (2002) (explaining that "Enron's basic business plan-combining
contracting over commodities with supplying the physical asset itself--created a large network of
interrelated entities" which, although they had tax and accounting advantages, made it "difficult for
those in charge to assess exactly how any given Enron division was performing"). As the authors
note:
One of the worst things a decisionmaker can do is pollute her own sources of
information. The sheer complexity of understanding what Enron did and did not own
undermined the business model premised upon the idea that a firm that combines the




a while.295 Since the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1978, the
SEC has required registered or reporting companies to have a system of internal
financial controls, and has imposed liability for failing to adequately maintain
financial controls.296 In the 1980s, the securities industry began creating internal
compliance programs and routinely began to engage outside counsel for internal
investigations.297 In addition, recognizing the centrality of the problem of
information and accountability to modem business, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines permit a reduction in criminal sentence for guilty corporations that
have in place an effective corporate compliance program to monitor and assure
the flow of information and prescribe steps to be taken in the event of a mis-
step.298 Thus, the duty of care imposed by the guidelines requires firm managers
to maintain adequate oversight of the firm's operations and to obtain adequate
and reliable information before making decisions and taking action.2 99
Although such programs are already widespread,3" the effectiveness of
corporate compliance programs has been hotly debated. Since 1997, for
example, despite the widespread adoption of compliance programs, there has
been a significant growth in financial restatements to correct material
295. For a brief history of such legislative attempts to stimulate corporate self-policing, see
Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the
Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2123, 2124 (2003).
296. See SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749-50 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(discussing Securities Exchange Act § 13); see also COX ET AL., supra note 175, at 705 (discussing
the legislative history of § 13(b)(2) and explaining that although a firm's materially misleading
financial statements were actionable even before the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, their passage
clarified situations "where... the law governing the primary disclosure duty is quite fuzzy," such
as where the deficiency is quantitatively immaterial but raises questions about "character,
competence or integrity of management"). Courts have not permitted private causes of action to
proceed under the accounting controls provisions. See, e.g., Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316,
1332 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
297. Donald B. Ayer & James J. Graham, Corporate Disclosure Programs: Voluntary and
Mandatory, I Bus. CRIuMEs BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LITIG. 4 (May 1994).
298. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations reduce fines for violations that have
taken place despite the presence of an effective compliance program. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f), 8C2.6.
This is based on the theory that organizational due diligence is a proxy for intent. I do not disagree
with that theory. Rather, I disagree with the notion of a corporate partnership in crime control.
299. U.S.S.G. § 8AI.2, comment 3(k)(2); In re W.R.Grace & Co. Report, SEC Rel. No. 34-
39157 (Sept. 30, 1997) (concluding that officers and directors of W.R. Grace & Co. failed to fulfill
their obligations under the securities laws by failing to inquire into the reasons for nondisclosure
in periodic reports of material information of which they were aware). At least one state law
decision has weighed in (at least in dicta) opining that failure to have such a program would be a
breach of state law fiduciary duty. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
300. See Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies' Bi-Modal
Penalties, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 147 n.84 (1997) (citing a survey showing that 75 to
95% of U.S. firms have written codes of conduct).
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misrepresentations of financial results, primarily due to revenue recognition
issues.3"' While many commentators extol the ability of compliance programs
to ensure the flow of information within the firm,3"2 there are a number of valid
criticisms of such programs. One criticism is that the only effect of such
programs has been to shift the locus of liability further down the corporate
hierarchy.3"3 People who run the company will attempt to minimize their own
risks. As a consequence, the senior personnel have incentives to report fraud
only if there is little chance that they will be implicated.04
Because these programs create many cosmetic rather than real changes,
legislators have attempted to give them some force.3"5 An effective compliance
301. United States General Accounting Office, Report on Financial Statement Restatements
(Oct. 2002), at 14-15 (noting that while the number of listed companies decreased by 20% from
1997-2002, the number of listed companies restating their financials increased by 165% to a
projected 3% of listed companies by the end of 2002). Over this period the average (median)
market capitalization of a restating company grew from $500 million ($143 million) in 1997 to $2
billion ($353 million) in 2002. Id. at 17. The GAO database excluded announcements of
restatements for reasons other than material misstatements of financial results. Id. at 21. For
example, the WorldCom restatements involved overstating net income by recording operating
expenses as capital expenditures. See WorldCom Press Release, WorldCom Announces Intention
to Restate 2001 and First Quarter 2002 Financial Statements (June 25, 2002).
302. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 2, at 15 (opining that "[elstablishment of control systems
within the firm and protecting whistleblowers helps ensure the flow of information within the
company"); Lynn L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and
Their Directorsfor Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
(forthcoming) (proposing increased implementation of ethical compliance programs); Diana E.
Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting
Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697 (2002) (discussing the positive effects of the
corporate compliance programs induced by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); H. Lowell Brown,
The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post-Caremark Era, 26 DEL.
J. CORp. L. 1 (2001) (advocating increased use of internal control systems); Pamela H. Bucy,
Corporate Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095,
1099 (1991) (published shortly before the organizational guidelines became effective; advocating
the implementation of compliance programs).
303. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors,
87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 648-49 (2002) (discussing the trend toward "reverse whistleblowing" in
corporations as a result of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines' incentives structure); William
S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1343, 1350 (1999) (opining that firms "have been extraordinarily successful in shifting both the
locus of liability risk and the enforcement function down the corporate hierarchy").
304. See James J. Graham & Morris Silverstein, Voluntary Disclosure Bandwagon: Pitfalls
for Federal Agencies, 2 Bus. CRIMES BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LIiG. 2, 2 (1995) (observing that in
the defense industry, although voluntary disclosure programs resulted in increased reporting of
minor accounting discrepancies, few ofthe more serious crimes involving high level personnel were
uncovered).
305. See, e.g. Note, supra note 295, at 2127 (noting critics who assert that compliance codes
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program risks generating incriminating information, making truly effective
programs unduly expensive to the corporation's management and thereby
decreasing incentives to engage in meaningful self-evaluation.3" Another critique
of the purported partnership in fighting crime is that the pervasiveness of agency
costs makes optimal compliance unlikely." 7 Moreover, the risks associated with
internal investigations-the backbone of any accountability program-may
create incentives for half-hearted compliance. There is a risk that the information
generated by an internal investigation may identify a problem that will force
affirmative action to avoid liability; this risk is a deterrent to serious
investigatory efforts.30 8 Also present is the threat that the investigation may
uncover discoverable documents that could be used against the firm and its
managers in private civil litigation."0 9 Further, a firm that does not properly
implement and enforce a rigorous compliance program may be in worse
shape-by exposing itself to grater liability-than a firm with a less rigorous
code.3"'
Compliance programs are not cheap. They are costly to set up and run, and
the people employed in the compliance office will have their own rent-seeking
agendas.31" ' Not only is disclosure involving highly placed personnel rare, but
supervisory personnel are in the best position to frame any disclosure and thus
shape the facts. They are also expensive in the sense that it is difficult to tell how
effectively the monitoring is being done." 2 The theoretical justification for
"comprise little more than platitudes" and asserting "the need for corporate codes with teeth").
Both codes of ethics and internal controls programs are part of corporate compliance, so although
the Note addresses § 406 (the code of ethics requirement) rather than the § 404 internal controls
requirement, the concerns are similar for both. Id. at 2138 (noting the problem).
306. See, Jay P. Kesan, Encouraging Firms to Police Themselves: Strategic Prescriptions to
Promote Corporate Self-Auditing, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 155 (discussing the perils of self-evaluation
with respect to environmental laws).
307. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 111 (2002). This concern for conflicting
interests is addressed in two major changes wrought by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, one prohibiting
auditors from providing contemporaneous consulting services to the firms they audit (§ 204(a)), and
one prohibiting firms from extending personal loans (or arranging them) to officers and directors
(§ 402(a)).
308. Michael P. Kenny & William R. Mitchelson, Jr., Corporate Benefits of Properly
Conducted Internal Investigations, I I GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 661 (1995).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1560 n.8
(1990) (noting the dangers of implementation).
311. See Langevoort, supra note 284, at 100 (noting that "[aill economic units within an
organization tend to construe ambiguous information in a self-serving way that maximizes its
influence and, hence, claim to additional resources").
312. Arlen and Kraakman argue that the optimal level of deterrence can be provided by a
mixture of high penalties and a self-policing duty, although they acknowledge the difficulties of
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imposing the costs of internal investigations is that the organization is in the best
position to detect and deter aberrant behavior. These costs, however, are not
imposed upon the people who can detect and deter misconduct, but on the
shareholders, who have little power to affect management decisions." 3
B. The Risky Shift and Strategic Interactions
Corporate compliance programs, like the system of internal financial controls
mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, although praised as a partnership in crime control
and meant to align the interests of business with the public interest,3"4 are
ineffective in deterring corporate misconduct, because they are not based on the
decisionmaking processes of interacting groups.3" The context where
monitoring counts is where the firm is experiencing conditions of relative loss.
Although classical economists claimed that people are naturally risk averse, this
is not necessarily so. Instead, people appear to avoid risky actions only when
they are experiencing relative wealth.316 They favor risky actions when they are
in a losing situation." 7 For example, when all options are undesirable, high risk
gambles are often preferred to fairly certain losses.3" 8 Daniel Kahnemann and
Amos Tversky proposed a formal model that they called prospect theory, in
which people are both risk-seeking and risk-averse: risk-averse for moderate
probabilities and risk-seeking for small probabilities of gain; the opposite for
probabilities of loss.3 9 When this kind of relative loss occurs, cover-ups are
proving optimal self-policing. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 289, at 716 (noting that "a duty-
based regime can solve the credibility problem only if the court can determine whether the firm has
implemented efficient enforcement measures").
313. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations,
71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 327 (1991) (observing that under conditions of near-bankruptcy, there are
strong managerial incentives for misconduct in order to save their jobs, and that when there has
been a period of lax enforcement, corporate culture may permit adoption of profitable but illegal
practices).
314. See JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY COMPULSION (1988) (describing the growth of the idea of
government-business cooperation).
315. Beecher-Monas, supra note 259, at 357 (describing cognitive biases undercutting the
effectiveness of compliance programs).
316. See Amos Tversky & D. Kahnemann, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59
J. Bus. 251-94 (1986) (studies showing that people treat risks concerning perceived gains
differently from risks concerning perceived losses).
317. See T. S. Bateman & C.T. Zeithaml, The Psychological Context of Strategic Decisions:
A Model and Convergent Findings, 10 J. STRATEGIC MGMT. 59-74 (1989).
318. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: AnAnalysis ofDecision Under
Risk 47 ECONOMETRICA 263-90 (1979).
319. See generally id. at 263-91.Since its original proposal, prospect theory has been tested
extensively. See, e.g., George Wu et al., Decision Under Risk, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF




Enron began to experience intense financial pressures immediately before the
board approved the risky-and conflicted-structured financing transactions that
ultimately led to the firm's demise. Although Enron appeared highly profitable
between 1995-2000, when its revenue grew at a compound annual rate of more
than 60%, its investments in energy and water plants and fiber optic networks
were sizeable and did not produce the anticipated income stream.32' After 1997,
Enron's cost of capital consistently exceeded its return on invested capital, and
its annual return on invested capital decreased from October 1995 until Enron
finally declared bankruptcy in December 2001 32 The transformation of Enron's
old-fashioned energy business-oil and gas pipelines, power plants, etc.-into
an online energy trading business, similar to a derivatives trading company, made
the literature and discussing the original prospect theory and its later refinements, evaluating their
strengths and weaknesses).
320. This risky shift presents the familiar "last period problem," in which, as Arlen and
Kraakman discovered, most open market securities frauds are prompted by the self-interested fears
ofmanagement that adverse financial results-periods ofrelative loss-will cause them to lose their
jobs. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 289, at 724-30 (demonstrating that most securities frauds
occur when firms face the threat of insolvency, and arguing that it is rational for managers to
postpone or avoid disaster by taking escalating risks that culminate in corporate cover-ups,
including securities fraud). Management takes risks to buy time during which a corporate turn
around may be possible, or to hang on as long as they can. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping
Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARiZ. L. REV. 639, 655 (1996) (discussing the
findings of both Jennifer Arlen and William Carney). When businesses experience financial
reverses, agency incentives tend to reinforce the risk preference bias predicted by prospect theory.
See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers'Rules, Auditors'Rules, and the Psychology of Concealment, 84
MINN. L. REv. 1399, 1419 (2000); Dan J. Laughmunn et al., Risk Preferences for Below Target
Returns, 26 J. MGMT. SCL. 1238 (1980) (documenting managerial risk seeking under conditions of
relative loss). Thus, corporate cover-ups are predictable if the corporation faces bankruptcy. See
Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 289, at 724-27 (discussing the predictability of corporate
nondisclosure in periods where the corporation faces insolvency). Corporate governance
innovations devoted to reduce managerial risk aversion and encourage a more entrepreneurial risk-
taking perspective (such as compensation that rewards short-term stock price gains) may actually
exacerbate a firm's downward spiral. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early
Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371, 1374
(2002). The author noted that over
the last two decades, much thought has been devoted to finding ways to direct the
attention of boards and directors away from a safe managerialist perspective focusing
on entity preservation, and toward a more entrepreneurial, risk-taking, and competitive-
enhancing attitude ... [such as] the implementation of compensation policies for
managers and directors that reward short-term stock price gains.
321. See Stuart L. Gillan & John D. Martin, Working Paper Series, Financial Engineering,
Corporate Governance, and the Collapse ofEnron, U. Del. Center for Corporate Governance 2002,
at 7 (2002), http://www.be.udel.edu/ccg/research.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
322. Id. at 37.
[Vol. 37:141
REGULATING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
significant cash flow imperative.323 Because it needed significant amounts of
daily cash to settle its contracts, Enron depended upon large lines of credit, the
availability of which were based on Enron's credit ratings.324 Credit ratings in
turn are based on a firm's financial statements. Therefore, to obtain investment-
grade credit ratings, Enron had to increase cash flow, lower debt, and prevent
large earnings fluctuations .3" This loss-framing may have influenced the
subsequent events. In order to accomplish these goals, the company decided on
a strategy of shedding (or increasing immediate returns on) company assets like
power plants that had low returns and persistent debt.326 Because Enron was not
able to find any buyers for these assets, these financial pressures created an
intensifying debt burden.327 This is precisely the kind of relative loss that
predicts risky behavior.
These pressures, framed in terms of relative losses, created a context for
taking risks that placed the firm in great danger and ultimately caused its demise.
Enron reported more gain on its operations than it made.328 Because it could not
find buyers for its assets, it sold them to "unconsolidated affiliates." '329 It
engaged in many transactions that gained it nothing other than an ability to hide
its finances.330 It exposed itself to contingent liabilities through its special
purpose entities. 3 ' It also permitted these off-balance sheet special purpose
entities to be run by Enron officers, a conflict prohibited by Enron's compliance
program. These decisions were made by (or under the direction of) Enron's
directors, who operated under a state-of-the-art corporate governance structure.
In hindsight, those were terrible decisions. The important question now,
however, is whether Sarbanes-Oxley can prevent future debacles. Optimism and
the illusion of control tend to increase risk taking. 32 This is not a bad thing
under normal conditions, when managers and directors tend to be risk averse and
323. See Enron Report, supra note 58, at 7 (noting that Enron's online energy trading business
bought and sold contracts to deliver natural gas, oil or electricity, treating them like commodity
futures-but outside the regulatory purview of the securities or commodities laws).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. As the presentation made to the Finance Committee explains, "[I]imited cash flow to
service additional debt," combined with "[I]imited earnings to cover dilution of additional equity"
meant that "Enron must syndicate ... in order to grow." Id. (quoting Finance Committee
Presentation (Oct. 2000)).
327. Id.
328. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 294, at 1801.
329. See Enron Report, supra note 58, at 7-8 (noting the Enron board's "intense focus on its
credit rating, cash flow, and debt burden").
330. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra 294, at 1804 (citing the example of the Raptor III
transaction, for which it paid LJM2 $39.5 million without gaining anything "other than an ability
to hide its finances from investors for losses over the short term").
331. Gillan & Martin, supra note 321, at 9.
332. Daniel Kahnemann & Dan Lovello, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SC. 17, 28 (1993).
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loss averse.13 3 But when the company is experiencing financial reversals-under
conditions of loss-where they are apt to be risk preferring, it could spell
disaster. For example, Enron's management apparently persuaded itself-despite
massive evidence to the contrary-that what worked in the context of
deregulating energy markets in the United States could work in other markets
globally. 3 4 As a result of this overconfidence, their financial models appear to
have been hopelessly inaccurate.
C. The Role of the Board of Directors
In many ways, the Enron board appears to have met or exceeded the
standards set by Sarbanes-Oxley, at least in form. For example, Enron's board
had both an audit committee and a finance committee.35 The audit committee
advised the board on hiring the firm's independent auditor, ensured that the
auditor was accountable, reviewed the auditor's compensation, reviewed the
firm's annual financial statements, reviewed the financial statements included in
the Annual Report to Shareholders, footnotes and management commentaries,
and Form 10-K fillings, approved major changes and other choices regarding the
appropriate accounting principles and practices to be followed in preparing the
financial statements, assessed the firm's internal financial control systems,
approved for recommendation to the board the corporate compliance policies and
procedures, and filed a report in the annual proxy statement.336 The finance
committee was responsible, among other things, for monitoring management
financial policy, plans and proposals, changes in risk management policy and the
transaction approval process.337
Despite having what appeared to be an ideal corporate governance structure,
Enron's board and subcommittees made a number of decisions that accelerated
its shift toward risky alternatives.3"' First, in February 1999, the audit committee
made the decision to reappoint as auditor Arthur Anderson, a questionable
decision in light of the conflict between Anderson's role as a financial
consultant and its role as auditor of the same transactions it had recommended.
333. As Kahneman & Lovallo note, "Bold forecasts and timid attitudes to risk tend to have
opposite effects." Id. at 30. Countering risk aversion may be one of the reasons for prizing
managerial optimism. However, under conditions of risk preference, overconfidence could lead
to very bad judgment. See id (noting that "[i]ncreasing risk taking could easily go too far in the
presence of optimistic forecasts").
334. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 294, at 1797.
335. ENRON CORP., AUDIT AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER (as amended Feb. 12,
2001), in ENRON CORP. PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 44-47(2001). It also had compliance, compensation and management
development, executive, nominating, and corporate governance committees. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Enron Report, supra note 58, at 12 (observing that "more than a dozen incidents over 3
years... should have raised Board concerns").
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In addition, Anderson had acknowledged that Enron's accounting practices
(practices Anderson had consulted on) were highly risky. 39 This decision was
revisited, with similar results, once or twice a year thereafter.34 A second series
of decisions entailed the waiver of conflicts of interest provisions in Enron's
code. At a special meeting of the board in June 1999 (held by teleconference),
the entire board approved the formation of a special purpose entity, LJM, to be
owned and managed by CFO Fastow, without the prescribed approval of the
finance committee.34" ' This decision entailed waiving the conflict of interest
provisions to permit CFO Fastow to manage the special purpose entity, but the
board failed to put any controls in place to monitor this self-dealing
transaction .342
Twice more in 1999 and 2000 the board approved similar special purpose
entities allowing the firm's CFO to set up special purpose entities to improve
Enron's financial statements.343 Not until February 2001 did the board (through
the compensation committee) request any information about the extent to which
the CFO was personally benefitting from these transactions, and when the
information was not forthcoming, the matter was dropped.34 4  The board
continued to approve structured financing transactions until by October 2000
nearly half of its assets were in Enron's "unconsolidated affiliates. 345 For many
of these entities, the board also approved guaranteeing the off-book entity's
debt.
346
These facts may be unique to Enron.3 47 The decisions of Enron's directors,
however, illustrate a number of reasons why the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's reliance
339. Id. at 17 (citing Audit Committee Minutes).
340. Id. (citing Audit Committee presentations 1999-2001).
341. Id. at 24.
342. Although the board's ratification of the CEO's waiver of the firm's code of conduct was
not required, it was explicitly requested at each of the LJM presentations. Id. at 24 (citing board
presentations).
343. Id. at 12.
344. Id. at 32-33 (noting that it was not until a Wall Street Journal article appeared on October
19, 2001 that the board decided to place Fastow on leave) (citing Enron CFO's Partnership Had
Millions in Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001).
345. Id. at 8 (citing October 2000 presentation to the finance committee).
346. Id. at 12 (citing the example of Whitewing, where the board approved moving an
affiliated company off Enron's books while guaranteeing its debt with Enron stock, and noting that
"Committee and Board presentations throughout 1999, 2000, and 2001 chronicled the company's
foray into more and more off-the-books activity.").
347. As Professor Coffee notes, "the problem with viewing Enron as an indiction of any
systematic governance failure is that its core facts are maddeningly unique." Coffee, supra note 2,
at 1403 (opining that "the passive performance of Enron's board of directors cannot fairly be
extrapolated and applied as an assessment of all boards generally"). Although the particular
decisions the Enron board made were unique and the product of the innovative circumstances of




on corporate compliance programs to achieve accountability is misconceived.
First, a large percentage of directors of publicly held corporations are CEO's of
their own firms.34  Directors who manage their own firms and who have
themselves been advocating structured financing as a way of improving financial
appearances3 49 may be inclined to see them as legitimate when asked to approve
them as directors. CEO's who are reluctant to disclose facets of the internal
workings of their own firms may be predisposed to tolerate iffy disclosure as
directors. People who, as CEO's, have urged the appointment of auditors who
consulted on the structured financing they were to audit may be less inclined to
object when they are asked, as directors, to approve such appointments. 50
In addition, the audit committee-a group of financial experts-may be more
prone to overconfidence than the board as a whole,' making their placement as
monitors-in-chief counterproductive. Moreover, confidence tends to be highest
when people believe that there is consensus for their opinion and that a decision
must be made quickly.352 This is all too often the context of board decisions.
The unconscious heuristics and biases discussed above explain only part of
the decisionmaking process. Strategic interactions also come into play.
Reciprocity pays, especially in repeat interactions (such as those in the
management/director game) within a small group, where people can keep track
of previous behavior.353 Although outside directors have their own corporate
348. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863,874-75 (1991 ) (noting that "63 percent of outside
directors of public companies are chief executive officers of other public companies").
349. Structured financing is prevalent among large firms, although most do not push the
envelope as strenuously as Enron appears to have done. See Schwarcz, supra note 75, at 1309
(examining the differences between "the trillions of dollars of supposedly 'legitimate'
securitization" and that of Enron).
350. See Paul E. Jones & Peter H. Roelofsma, The Potentialfor Social Contextual and Group
Biases in Team Decision-Making: Biases, Conditions and Psychological Mechanisms, 43
ERGONoMICs 1129, 1144 (2000) (noting that one explanation of group polarization dynamics is that
it "stems from people's motivation to be perceived, and to present themselves, in a favourable
light").
351. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 498 (2002) (noting that overconfidence in their
predictions is a "bias to which experts may be more prone than novices"); see also Philip E.
Tetlock et al., Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 403, 419 (1992) (testing the empirical basis and theoretical logic
of the groupthink model and noting that "groupthink promoted rigid and self-righteous patterns of
thinking").
352. Ruben Orive, Group Consensus, Action Immediacy, and Opinion Confidence, 14
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 573 (1988) (studies). The conditions of consensus and
immediacy appear to have been present in each of the troubling Enron decisions. For example, the
Enron board reported nearly unanimous decisions that were typically made within one to two hours.
See Enron Report, supra note 58, at 8.
353. See VERNON L. SMITH, BARGAINING AND MARKET BEHAVIOR 117 (2000) (explaining that
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cultures (since they are drawn primarily from executive positions in other firms,
academia and government 54), they nonetheless interact over time (at least five
of the Enron board members, for example, had been with the firm since 1985,
and the average in 2000 was eight years of service355).
Thus, their incentives for acting cooperatively toward each other may have
outweighed the incentives to act cooperatively toward their investors. When
people have to decide between competing courses of action, it is much easier to
discount harm to statistical others-the investors, for example-than to people
you know.356
In the corporate governance game played by managers and directors, the
players' strategies is a repeated prisoners dilemma game, in which the players
must decide whether to observe their fiduciary duties or evade them.
Management's options are to comply with their fiduciary duties or evade them,
while directors' options are to adopt a cooperative or deterrent enforcement
strategy. If both cooperate, that is the social optimum because directors will not
have to expend resources (time or energy) in monitoring and management can
concentrate on meeting business goals rather than worrying about minor
infractions. If directors behave cooperatively, however, management has
incentives to behave opportunistically and if directors know that management
will comply with its fiduciary duties, it may have incentives to nit-pick the details
of management proposals rather than concentrating on business goals. The
temptations to defect may cause directors to undertake an inefficient amount of
scrutiny, while management may forego innovative business opportunities. A tit-
for-tat strategy (or its kin, a firm-but-fair strategy) may avoid this inefficient
outcome by having directors adopt a more discretionary monitoring strategy
during periods where management's temptation to defect is lower (periods of
relative gain, for example) or where there is little danger of conflict of interest.
Joint cooperation or joint defection are the only plausible equilibria. 7
reciprocity, in which "individuals incur short-term costs for their sharing in exchange for delayed
benefits for others' sharing," is "possible in close-knit communities because each individual can
'keep score' and punish free-riders with sanctions" but "break down where sociability is pushed to
the edge of credibility").
354. Sixty-three percent of outside directors are CEO's of other public companies. Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 348, at 874-75. As Gilson & Kraakman observe, "[they] are unlikely to
monitor more energetically than they believe they should be monitored by their own boards." Id.
at 875. Moreover, "personal and psychic ties to the individuals who are responsible for one's
appointment" as well as "substantial director compensation" may further act to align directors'
interests with management's rather than with the shareholders. Charles M. Elson, Director
Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-the History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50
SMU L. REv. 127, 161-62 (1996).
355. Enron 2001 Proxy Statement.
356. See George Lowenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-
Offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CoNDuCT 214-15 (David M. Messick & Ann E.
Tenbrunsel, eds. 1996) (discussing the trade-offs between options and courses of action).
357. For a discussion of the economics of the game-theoretic model, see Scholz, supra note
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When the directors' sucker payoff (for management defection) exceeds its
punishment payoff, however, capture by management is likely. Rather than
leading tojoint defection (i.e., stricter director scrutiny of management proposals
and increased willingness to vote them down), when this happens, management
defection may lead to the management defect: director cooperate equilibrium, a
result that is not socially optimal. The social ties that directors frequently have
with management, the identification of directors who are CEOs of their own
firms with management, and the effort that must be expended in monitoring and
uncovering information all make this capture equilibrium more likely.35s
Regulators and the regulated community are also repeat players in this sense.
Cooperation is likely to evolve in such interactions, but the interactions may
become corruption and capture as well as optimal business behavior.3" 9 Agencies
(such as the SEC) are much more likely to cooperate than defect, because
monitoring and punishment are costly.36 The theory of an enforcement pyramid
is that legal compliance is more likely to be effective when a regulatory agency
begins by cooperating with the regulated (here a corporation) in a tit-for-tat
game, coaxing compliance through self-regulation, with a graduated series of
sanctions for infractions, culminating with severe punishment for severe and
repeated violations. 61 The Sarbanes-Oxley model of regulation mandates self-
regulation in the form of the internal controls system and audit committee
monitoring, and it has increased the severity of sanctions for violations.362 The
punishments are still graduated, because penalties will be enforced in
conjunction with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.363 Thus, the model
employed by Sarbanes-Oxley depends on self-regulation and graduated sanctions.
What is missing, however, is the third face of Ayres' and Braithwaite's
100, at 188.
358. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate
Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 857 (observing that "board oversight may be
doomed" because "directors who must monitor the managers have been appointed by the very
managers they must monitor" and this creates "a great incentive for passivity and acquiescence to
management's initiatives and little incentive to actively monitor").
359. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 100, at 55 (noting that the "conditions that foster
the evolution of cooperation are also the conditions that promote the evolution of capture and
indeed corruption").
360. Id. at 70 (noting that "firm defection must be of extraordinary proportions to overcome
the attitudinal resistance of regulators to punishment" and suggesting tripartisim as a solution).
361. Id. at 35-40 (outlining the structure of the enforcement pyramid).
362. For example, earnings restatements due to material noncompliance will require the CEO
and CFO to reimburse the corporation for any bonus received during the period covered by the
restatement under 304; increased criminal penalties for securities violations under 807, 1106;
increased criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud under 903 and ERISA under 904; making
failure to certify financial reports a crime under 906.
363. Cf Laufer, supra note 303, at 644 (noting that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
constitute "a dynamic enforcement game backed by a 'tall enforcement pyramid').
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enforcement pyramid, the participation of public interest groups.364 Investor
litigation might have functioned as public interest groups, enabling the
enforcement pyramid.36 These groups have been disabled by PSLRA and
Central Bank, as well asjudicial hostility to securities class actions, however.3 6
Arguably, increasing the size of the penalty, as Sarbanes-Oxley did,367 might
have an effect on deterring corporate misconduct. Under an economic notion of
deterrence, either increased enforcement or increased penalties will deter
misconduct.3 6 Empirically, however, increasing the size of the penalties does
not appear to have an effect on misconduct.369 On the contrary, increasing the
size of the penalty appears to be counter-productive, because it reduces
monitoring.37
Sarbanes-Oxley also purports to increase SEC monitoring.37" ' If believed,
364. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 100, at 56 (advocating tripartism by permitting
public interest groups to "become a fully fledged third player in the game" that "can directly punish
the firm" and thus "secure the advantages of the evolution of cooperation while averting the
evolution of capture and corruption").
365. Although Ayres and Braithwaite conceived of the public interest group participation on
the front end of the regulatory process, by providing them with full information about the deals cut
between regulators and the regulated, they acknowledge that "back-end standing is a prerequisite
for front-end submissions to be taken seriously." Id. at 77-78.
366. See supra Part II.E.2.b.
367. For example, maximum penalties for mail and wire fraud have been increased from five
to twenty years, under Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 903; under § 1106 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a))
securities fraud violations under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act have been increased for
individuals to fines of $5 million (from $1 million) and terms of 20 years (from 10 years) and for
organizations fines have been increased to $25 million from $2.5 million. These provisions are
unlikely to actually change expected penalties, however, because maximum statutory sentences
merely set an outside limit for the sentence. See Perino, supra note 286, at 686 (observing that the
"penalty enhancements are unlikely to deter corporate crime to any greater degree than current
provisions").
368. See, e.g., George Tsebelis, The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson
Crusoe Fallacy, 83 AM. POLl. SC. REV. 77, 79 (explaining and debunking the economic theory that
the expected utility of misconduct depends on the size of the penalty).
369. See Scholz, supra note 100, at 255 (noting that although the level of compliance increases
after penalties are imposed, in OSHA inspections "the size of the penalty has little impact on safety
improvements, contradicting the basic premise of deterrence theory that large expected penalties
explain compliance").
370. See George Tsebelis, Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and
Empiriccal Evidence, 5 J. THEORETICAL POLITICs 349 (1993) ("[l]ncreases in penalty have no
impact on crime, but reduce police monitoring.").
371. For example, maximum penalties for mail and wire fraud have been increased from five
to twenty years under Sarbanes-Oxley § 903; under § 1106 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)),
securities fraud violations have been increased for individuals (from $1 million to $5 million and
from ten years to twenty years) and organizations (from $2.5 million to $25 million). These
provisions are unlikely to actually change expected penalties, however, because prosecutorial
2003)
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
such statements about increased enforcement will save time, money and effort.3 72
There are some reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness of this measure.
Even if such statements do result in increased monitoring and misconduct
decreases as a result, the result will tend to be cyclical because as soon as
misconduct decreases, so will enforcement. 373 Thus, "certainty and severity of
penalty are inversely related. 3 74 It is not the size of the "big gun '37' at the top
of the enforcement pyramid that affects the rate of corporate misconduct but the
rate of monitoring and enforcement.
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL: MONITORING THROUGH SELF-INSURANCE
Given the foibles of human decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty,
given divergent incentives and interdependence of the players, how can we
structure the game to provide optimal social gains? Game theory models the way
legal rules can influence strategic actors by altering the information structure of
the game, players' strategies, or their payoffs.376 There is no duty to disclose
everything a director knows or learns, or every business risk, but there is a duty
to truthfully report (at least periodically) on the financial status of the firm.
Monitoring whether the firm is doing so, however, is difficult and leads to the
possibility of opportunism. 3 77 Misleading financial disclosures are the leading
source of shareholder claims, and they appear to be increasing at the same time
as claims related to mergers, acquisitions and divestitures have been more than
halved.378
discretion in the number of charges brought has a greater actual effect on penalties. See Perino,
supra note 286, at 686 (observing that the "penalty enhancements are unlikely to deter corporate
crime to any greater degree than current provisions").
372. Tsebelis, supra note 370, at 356 (explaining that such announcements must be considered
part of the enforcement strategy).
373. See id. (describing the "evolutionary model which produces cycles of crime as well as
cycles of law enforcement" and explaining that even if the crime rate initially goes down in
response to statements about increased enforcement, decreased crime will provoke decreased
monitoring, and ultimately the crime rate will rise again).
374. Id. at 360.
375. Ayres & Braithwaite explained that the "successful pursuit of cooperative regulation and
maximum compliance with the law is predicted by: use of tit-for-tat strategy, access to a hierarchical
range of sanctions and a hierarchy of interventionism in regulatory style (the enforcement pyramid);
and how extreme in punitiveness is the upper limit of the range of sanctions." AYRES &
BRAITHWArrE, supra note 100, at 65.
376. For a comprehensive discussion of game theory models, see generally BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 6.
377. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 167 (discussing the concept of moral hazard,
the "form of postcontractual opportunism that arises because actions that have efficiency
consequences are not freely observable and so the person taking them may choose to pursue his or
her private interests at others' expense).
378. See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, 2001 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY Su vEY
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Well run corporations should establish a corporate policy addressing risk,
and adequately inform themselves about those risks, as well as delineate policies
about when such risks must be disclosed." 9 In terms of what should be
disclosed, information that is--or ought to be, in a well-run company-before the
directors and officers includes financial information, current business
developments, and future plans. This is the same information that should be
before the investors and other stakeholders, such as employees."' Making sure
that this information gets out to the market is equally important.38 There is
strong evidence of the link between financial statement fraud and weak corporate
governance.382 But mandating corporate compliance programs, such as the
system under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, imposes high costs without any indication
of their effectiveness. A far more efficient solution would be to empower the
tripartite structure of the enforcement pyramid through a system of director
liability, actively enforced by the SEC and private litigation. Although
increasing the penalties on risk-averse decisionmakers may impose excessively
high social costs by stifling innovation,383 this reasoning does not apply to risk-
7 (2002) (reporting that 38.8%ofall shareholder claims involved inadequate or inaccurate financial
reporting, up from 34.5% in 2000 and 19.9% in 1990. At the same time, the percentage of
shareholder claims relating to merger, acquisition and divestiture activity declined from 40% in
1990 to 18% in 2001). But see Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management:
Reconciling the Views ofAccounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCOUNTING
HORIZONs 235,244 (2000) (expressing uncertainty asto whether the kind of financial reporting that
crosses over into fraud is increasing or just increasingly visible).
379. See, e.g., Dennis R. Dumas, Targeting the Board, Bus. L. TODAY, June 6, 1997, at 30
(discussing the importance of board policies regarding risk disclosure).
380. See COX ET AL., supra note 175, at 17 (explaining that the indirect costs of mandatory
disclosure, such as liability and erosion of competitive advantage are minuscule compared to the
uncertainty and delay of compliance with integrated disclosure for new offerings, and suggesting
that the solution is a company registration process coupled with the elimination of Section I I
liability).
381. Brokers' duties under the United States federal securities laws include an affirmative
obligation to have a reasonable basis for any recommendation. Mandatory disclosure gives brokers
such a basis. Recognizing the importance of brokers' recommendations, they may be liable to the
retail investor for any discrepancy in the information the issuer has released to the public and its
recommendation. Broker liability under § 12(2) of the 1934 Act is premised on any misstatements
in the broker's recommendation, together with the imposition of a suitability requirement.
382. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulations:
An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. I
(1996) (documenting links between financial statement fraud and weaker governance structures
such as an insider-dominated board, a CEO who is the company founder, CEO who is chairman of
the board, and the absence of an audit committee); see also Mark S. Beasley, An EmpiricalAnalysis
of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71
ACCOUNT. REV. 443 (1996) (similar conclusions about the presence of insiders, but finding that an
audit committee did not affect the probability of financial fraud).
383. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
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prone managers of corporations on the brink of insolvency.3S4
To prevent director and regulatory capture, third parties who are public-
regarding must be able to enforce compliance with regulation."' The costs of
capture are increased by having third party enforcement. In addition, this
tripartite enforcement structure pushes the evolution of cooperation by increasing
the randomness of enforcement, similar to the firm-but-fair strategy. Recall that
firm-but-fair is a strategy similar to tit-for-tat, except that it has the ability to
prevail in an environment of defectors by starting with cooperate as a strategy,
defecting in the next round if the other player defected in the first round, is "more
wary of resuming cooperation after a round of mutual defection, and does so only
with a certain probability, which depends on the precise payoff values and the
expected interaction length."3 6 It is more random, less predictable, and a good
strategy to prevent exploitation.
Investors are the logical choice for this third party enforcement.
Empowering investors avoids the problem that Ayres and Braithwaite recognized
in their tripartism structure in which the public interest groups that they
recommend as the third players in the regulation game are public-regarding, but
not firm profitability-regarding.3"7 Investors care about profitability as well as
transparency.
If directors face liability, they have a personal stake in becoming informed
monitors of corporate financial developments.38 Regulatory reluctance to pursue
directors for securities fraud,389 may stem from the fear that the specter of
liability will scare able directors away from service.3 In order to keep the ranks
of public firms' directors from being decimated after Smith v. Van Gorkom,", for
REv. 1551, 1562-63 (1998).
384. See Macey, supra note 313, at 338 (suggesting that because "increasing the probability
of detecting criminals is costly, the optimal deterrence scheme may involve keeping the probability
of detection low and the penalties high").
385. AYRES & BRAJrHWArrE, supra note 100, at 71.
386. Nowak et al., supra note 95, at 18.
387. AYRES & BRAImwAITE, supra note 100, at 71.
388. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 378, at 4, 7. D&O policies usually have three
separate components, corporate reimbursement coverage, which covers the organization's
indemnification responsibilities, entity coverage for claims against the organization, and personal
coverage for directors and officers for situations that are not covered by the indemnification
statutes. Although the average corporate reimbursement flat deductible was $418,000 for U.S.
insured for-profit corporations in 2001, 96% of the U.S. survey participants had no personal
coverage deductibles up from 50% of those surveyed in 1990. Id. at 5.
389. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 20 (noting how few cases are brought against directors).
390. Many articles were written after the Van Gorkom decision about the supposed flight of
directors from service. The evidence appears to be entirely anecdotal, however. See, e.g., Roberta
Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L. J. 1155,
1156 (1990) [hereinafter Romano, Corporate Governance] (discussing periodical articles about
directors leaving in droves).
391. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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example, many states enacted indemnification statutes.392 These statutes
typically permit shareholder approved charter amendments that either eliminate
or limit directors' liability for negligence.393 Thus, directors' exposure for
negligence is minimal.394 Reckless or wrongful conduct that may expose
directors to significant liability,39 however, and that is precisely the kind of
behavior at stake in the Enron, WorldCom and other recent corporate financial
fraud debacles. The problem is two-fold: lack of political will to enforce
regulation, and private litigation barriers. The reputational costs associated with
losing lawsuits are an important deterrent, even if the costs are paid by an
insurer.396
Insurance is a way of reducing the costs of risk bearing when people are
facing statistically independent risks.397 Relying on insurance may be
problematic. There is the well known problem of moral hazard; the directors
may undertake more risk if insurance will bail them out.39 In addition, insurance
392. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24,29 (1989) [hereinafter Romano, What Went Wrong] (noting
the "strong, critical reaction to the [Smith v. van Gorkom] decision by boards, commentators and
the Delaware legislature" resulting in a majority of states enacting indemnification statutes although
"the decision did not alter any substantive liability rule"). The indemnification statutes may have
proved popular with shareholders because they were perceived as "eliminating a class of lawsuits
where insurance payouts defray legal costs rather than compensate shareholders, and any deterrent
effect is quite problematic." See also Romano, Corporate Governance, supra note 390, at 1156
(concluding that shareholder derivative suits were the impetus for the widespread adoption of
charters indemnifying directors for negligence).
393. Romano, What Went Wrong, supra note 392, at 34. Insurance may be preferable to
indemnification even if they cover roughly the same exposure because if the corporation becomes
bankrupt, it will be unable to pay litigation claims, while the insurance will be unaffected.
394. See Romano, Corporate Governance, supra note 390, at 1160-61 (observing that "over
90% of a random sample of 180 Delaware firms adopted a limited liability provision within one
year of the statute's enactment").
395. See id. at 1161 ("[C]lass actions alleging federal securities law violations tend to generate
larger recoveries than derivative suits.").
396. See, e.g., Noel O'Sullivan, Insuring the Agents: The Role of Directors' and Officers'
Insurance in Corporate Governance, 64 J. RISK & INS. 545, 546 (1997) (explaining arguments in
favor of insurance).
397. See MiLGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 211 (explaining that "sharing independent
risks reduces the aggregate cost of bearing them"). Independent risks are those that are unrelated
to each other, for example the size of the state lottery and the level of the Dow Jones Industrial
average.
398. See id. at 174-76 (discussing the perverse effects of the moral hazard problem posed by
the juxtaposition of federal insurance with rate competition in the context of the savings and loan
disaster of the 1980's). The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s involved moral hazard not only
with respect to the S&L owners who gambled with their depositors' money (knowing that insurance
would cover their losses), but also the depositors (who relied on insurance rather than monitoring
the banks), and the legislature (which raised the amount of available insurance, attracting large
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is subject to cyclical availability that is not well understood.39 9 Exclusions may
limit coverage in unanticipated ways.4"' The premiums for Directors and
Officers Liability Insurance are increasingly expensive.4 " These problems are
not insurmountable, however.
Increased monitoring and verification are one solution to the moral hazard
problem.40 2 That was the role that auditors, the stock exchanges (sro's), rating
agencies and government regulators were supposed to play. While each of these
play a role in developing competing sources of information, they each have their
own interests that diverge from the goal of investors in monitoring the directors.
Insurance, on the other hand, has a stake in the monitoring process that is better
aligned with that of the shareholders.4 3
The "tall enforcement pyramid" of Ayres and Braithwaite, using escalating
regulatory sanctions in a tit-for-tat strategic game," solved the problem of
discovering information in large bureaucracies by having internal inspectors
more familiar with the workings of the corporation than outsiders could be.405
Directors' and officers' liability insurance ("D&O" insurance) typically
covers the costs of lawsuits against directors and officers brought by shareholders
and third parties, as long as there is neither an admission nor a judicial finding
of bad faith.406 Insurance costs and premiums will reflect litigation and business
risks, and insurers demand information from firms to assess these risks. Claims
and notifications of suits give the insurer an opportunity to examine the aspects
deposits to the S&L's without increased regulatory monitoring). Id. at 176.
399. See, e.g., Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2001 Directors and Officers Liability Survey
Summary at 3 (stating that "the firming of the D&O market--even the sharp increase seen by some
sectors-does not signal a return to crisis conditions similar to those of the mid- 1980's" and noting
that there is "less dependence on a small group of reinsurers now than 16 years ago"). See id. at
9.
400. For example, although there is no "standard" directors and officers liability insurance
policy, most policies have exclusions for self-dealing, and the numberof potential policy exclusions
has increased since 1984. Id. In addition, court interpretations of policy exclusions may create
some uncertainty.
401. See id. at 2 (noting that "[n]early all segments in the U.S. saw sharp increases in
premiums as well as more stringent underwriting").
402. See MILGROM& ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 186 (one remedy for moral hazard problems
is increased monitoring and verification).
403. See, e.g., John E. Core, The Director's and Officer's Insurance Premium: An Outside
Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 449 (2000).
(finding "a significant association between D&O premiums and variables that proxy for the quality
of firms' governance structures").
404. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 100, at 38-39.
405. See id. at 105 (citing Braithwaite's studies of the pharmaceutical industry in which
managerial inside knowledge of people and processes permitted him effective quality controls).
406. See Core, supra note 403, at 450 (describing D&O liability coverage). Corporate
coverage reimburses the firm when it indemnifies its officers and directors, and personal coverage
provides officers and directors with direct coverage if the corporation does not. Id. at 453-54.
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of corporate governance giving rise to the dispute, and thus provide for external
monitoring of the firm.4a7
Empowering a third group that has a direct stake in the interactions is a way
out of the capture conundrum in which directors' and regulators' sucker payoffs
are less than their punishment payoffs. The problems of cyclical availability and
what firms may consider to be exorbitant pricing can be solved by self-insurance.
A self-regulatory group for large publicly held corporations specifically focused
on detecting financial fraud may solve the moral hazard problem of diffuse
responsibility for financial reporting, as well as cyclical availability and
escalating costs that are unrelated to risk.
The structure I propose would be a self- insurance group that consists of
financial specialists. They would do both regular and spot inspections, and
advise the firm of any problems discovered in the audit. The information they
uncovered would be confidential." 8 Because the insurance rates would depend
on the compliance of the firms, the firms have a stake in complying with the self-
regulators. And the insurance group has its own interests-keeping liability
down-motivating it to do a thorough inspection. Because the majority of the
recent corporate debacles appear to have involved financing vehicles and
capitalization decisions, the insurance would be limited to financial disclosures.
CONCLUSION
Evolutionary game theory and empirical studies of cognition not only
challenge some of the fundamental assumptions of law and economics, they also
provide insights into the role of law in shaping optimal social interactions.
Socially efficient norms will not necessarily prevail without assistance.
Reciprocity is a key to human interactions, but evolutionary game theory
demonstrates the importance of structuring initial conditions and providing
coordinating signals to achieve socially optimal payoffs. Because not all
circumstances permit socially efficient norms to prevail, relying on market forces
to channel behavior is evolutionarily shortsighted. Regulation and enforcement
are important components of well functioning capital markets. Enforcement
efforts (private and public) have been dramatically curtailed, however. Investors'
legal protections have been shrinking. Legislative reform and judicial activism
have both eaten away at core investor protection principles. In the wake of this
trend, a series of spectacular corporate debacles has made headlines around the
world. From an international perspective, accommodating regulatory needs
while encouraging harmonization of a global marketplace demands sensible
minimal regulation coupled with shareholders empowered to police fraudulent
statements and omissions.
407. See O'Sullivan, supra note 396, at 545 (concluding that in large publicly held companies,
D&O insurance performs a monitoring function).
408. The SEC does not require firms to disclose anything about their D&O insurance to their
shareholders. Core, supra note 403, at 475. Thus, any information uncovered by the self-
investigatory body should remain similarly confidential.
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Large public corporations, with their bureaucratic diffusion of responsibility,
pose an immense challenge to efficient markets that depend on a free flow of
accurate information for their well being. The Enron implosion is an illustration
of the problems that such diffusion of responsibility can create. The immediate
congressional reaction to Enron, however, enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was
neither necessary nor sufficient to solve these problems. The corporate
governance provisions of the new legislation, although far from novel, are
misconceived. The corporate governance provisions do little to change existing
law, while imposing high costs on corporate shareholders. Moreover, although
the concept of a corporate/ government partnership in fighting corporate crime
has gained academic and political currency, there are good reasons to doubt the
efficacy of corporate compliance programs as a partner in crime control.
The idea that companies must conduct their business with as much openness
as possible is consonant with ideals of corporate democracy0 9 and with the
assumption that people make better decisions if they have more information.
Increased knowledge decreases uncertainty.410 The economic meaning of
information is not only data, but also the web of social practices through which
the data has meaning.41' At a very minimum, government's task is to ensure that
there is an appropriate macroeconomic climate for decisionmaking.1 2
Directors should not be able to evade liability for the abdication of their
oversight duties. Functional monitoring is a prerequisite for a sound economy.
Voluntary acceptance of rules that promote participants' objectives is
undoubtedly preferable to sanctions as an economic solution to achieving
cooperative behavior.413 It is certainly cheaper. But evolutionary game theory
posits that stabilizing cooperative interactions requires would-be defectors to face
the threat of sanctions and "that those who are charged with identifying defectors
409. See Stephen Labston, Bush Doctrine, Lock Em' Up, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 2002, § 3, at
12 (quoting Donald C. Langevoort) ("I[The broader view is that the investor needs not only a sense
of protection from bad apples [individual miscreants], but that companies must conduct themselves
with an eye toward more openness.").
410. See MARIO BUNGE, FINDING PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 83 (1996) (arguing that the
larger the number of variables in a particular problem, and the less is known about the variables'
interrelationships, the more complex the situation becomes, and the less relevant prior knowledge
becomes).
411. See Gerhard Roseger, Aspects of Uncertainty and Complexity in Technologies and
Technosystems, EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS IN DEMOCRACIES 123, 140 (Johann Gotschl ed., 200 1)
(arguing that innovation requires conditions for the diffusion of existing knowledge, and that in the
United States, the willingness to "suspend belief in competitive markets as the primary source of
all desirable innovations" resulted in creative technological innovations, but that these innovations
nonetheless were motivated by market signals).
412. See id. at 125 (discussing the importance of government in shaping conditions that
stimulate cooperation).
413. McClennon, supra note 149, at 183 (arguing that a commitment to rules is instrumentally
rational as a way of solving coordination problems).
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and carrying out such sanctions be sufficiently motivated to do so.""4  In
repeated interactions, informal norms of reciprocity may emerge, but only if
participants expect that defection will be met with retaliation at the next iteration
of the game.415 Increased reporting and punishment of defectors yield increased
cooperation if others in the community, who are not necessarily co-players, also
retaliate." 6 Thus, although insurance, like compliance programs, is a cost that
will be borne by the shareholders, it is more likely to be effective in deterring
corporate misconduct. Because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act fails to recognize or
accommodate the interactive strategic processes of director decisionmaking, it
is not likely solve the problems it set out to address, and will have little effect on
deterring or preventing corporate misconduct. In sum, insuring that directors
exercise their oversight functions is vital for a healthy economy.
414. d. at 209-10 n.55.
415. Id. at 200.
416. Id.
20031
